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Refracting the Spectrum of Clean Water
Act Standing in Light of Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlye
Karl S. Coplan*
There is an inherent tension between constitutional standing
doctrine and the citizens enforcement provisions of various federal
environmental statutes. The Supreme Court's articulation of standing doctrine under the Article I11 "case" or "controversy" requirement imposes requirements of "injury in fact," "causation," and
"redressability." These concepts do not neatly translate into citizen
enforcement of environmental regulatory schemes. Such statutes
are designed to prevent environmental injury before it is necessarily
perceptible. They impose requirements on polluters to whom perceptible adverse impacts of pollution may not be directly traceable.
And given the large number of potential sources of pollution to any
particular environmental resource, relief against any one polluter
may not necessarily be sufficient to "redress" the perceptible harms
to the environmental resource.
Despite the frequency with which standing issues have made it to
the United States Supreme Court, the Court has given remarkably
little guidance for application of standing doctrine in the citizen
enforcement suit context. All of the Supreme Court's environmental standing decisions have arisen in the context of citizen suits
seeking to require compliance with environmental laws by governmental agencies and actors; there is no Supreme Court decision
addressing standing doctrine in a case of a citizens enforcement
action against a private party. The inquiry is compounded by continued controversy about the extent to which Congress can, by statute, create new legal interests the invasion of which would
constitute an "injury in fact" sufficient to support Article I11
standing.

* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. B A , Middlebuly College,
1980;J.D.,
Columbia University, 1984. I am grateful to my colleague Ann Powers for reviewing a draft of this article.
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Although widely viewed as a retrenchment in standing doctrine,'
the Supreme Court's most recent standing decision, Lujan v. De&f
of
has not settled this controversy. Indeed, a majority of the Court in that case specifically endorsed the ability of
Congress to create newly recognizable injuries and chains of causation. The Court's opinion in Defenders of Wildlifeitself recognized a
category of "procedural" rights in which the strict requirements of
injury, causation, and redressability might not apply.
Nowhere is this tension between Congress' statutory goals and
strict application of constitutional standing requirements more pronounced than in the context of citizens enforcement actions under
the federal Clean Water Act.%The Federal Water Pollution Control
amendments of 1972 were enacted specifically to correct the previous statutory regime, which required proof that a discharger's pollutants were causing perceptible harm to a water body that could be
causally traced to that discharger's pollution for a prosecution to
proceed.
With the Clean Water Act, Congress adopted a system of discharge permits, monitoring reports, effluent limitations, and public
review procedures in order to ensure that enforcement could proceed without a showing of measurable harm to the receiving water
body or strict causation traceable to a particular violator. And, in its
citizen suit provision, Congress made equally clear its intention
that, in the absence of state or federal enforcement, citizens should
be able to enforce the Act's requirements on the same terms as the
government.
1. See genera& Robert Wiygul, GwalhEq, Eight Years Later: Proving Jurisdiction and Article
111 Standing in Clean Water Act Citizen Suits, 8 Tul. Envtl. L. J. 435 (1995); Robert B. June,
The Structure of Standing Requirements for Citizen Suits and the Scope of Congressional
Power, 24 Envt'l L. 761 (1994); Harold Feld, Saving the Citizen Suit: the Effect of Lujan v.
Def&
of W U f e and the Role of Citizens Suits & Environmental Enforcement, 19 Colum.
Journal of Env. L. 141 (1994); Harold J. Krent & Ethan G. Shenkman, Of Citizen Suits and
Citizen Sunstein, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 1793 (1993); Cass R Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article III,91 Mich. L. Rev. 163 (1992); Note, Charles S.
Abell, Ignoring the Trees for the Forest How the Citizens Suit Provision of the Clean Water
Act Violates the Constitution's Separation of Powers Principle, 81 Va. L. Rev 1957 (1995);
Comment, Christopher T. Bun, Mootness and Citizen Suit Civil Penalty Claims Under the
Clean Water Act: A Post-Lujan Reassessment, 25 Envt'l L. 801 (1995); Comment, Procedural
Injury Standing after Lujan v. Def&
of WIdlife, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 275 (1995).
2. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
3. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387.
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 have come to be known generally as the "Clean Water Act," and will be referred to throughout this article as the Clean
Water Act in text, and as "CWA" in footnotes.
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Despite the 24 year history of the Clean Water Act, some basic
standing questions remain unsettled: for example, can a citizen suit
be brought to challenge an undisputed permit violation where
there is no present or imminent perceptible effect on the receiving
water body?4 Can a citizen suit be enforced against the violation of
recordkeeping and reporting requirements imposed under the
Clean Water Act, where violations of such requirements do not directly result in additional pollution to the water body?5 Can a citizen suit be brought against a discharger who has failed to obtain a
required permit even if the discharges would have been permissible
with a
These problems do not fit neatly into an Article I11
rubric of "injury-in-fact," "causation," and "redressability."
The underlying tension between the Clean Water Act's goals and
strict application of Article I11 standing doctrine, together with the
lack of clear guidance from the Supreme Court, has lead to the
development of a wide spectrum of approaches to standing doctrine in the lower federal courts in citizens enforcement actions
under the Clean Water Act. The potential approaches range from
a strict "causation in fact" test at one extreme to the tantalizing possibility of universal citizen standing at the other. This article will
examine the various approaches to the application of standing doctrine to Clean Water Act citizen suits, and evaluate the consistency
of each of these approaches with the legislative intent of Congress
in adopting the Clean Water Act citizen suit provisions. The article
will also consider the impact of the Supreme Court's decision in
Lujan v. Def&
of WiZdlVe upon the continued validity of the various approaches to Clean Water Act citizens enforcement suits. The
article concludes that an approach to citizen suit standing that recognizes the standing of any plaintiff with a genuine, ongoing recreational, aesthetic, or organizational interest in the receiving water
body is most consistent with the Congressional intent behind the
4. Compare Friends of Earth v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp.; U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16338
(E.D.
1995) (standing denied because plaintiffs could point to no imminent injury to
wildlife caused by defendant's discharge) with Friends of Earth v. Chevron Chem. Co.,900 F.
Supp. 67 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (standing upheld even though defendant's conmbution was less
than .17% of flow to lake); cf: Public Interest Research Group of N.J.v. Magnesium Elektron,
Inc., U.S. App. LEXIS 20846 (3d Cir. 1997) (vacating judgment in favor of plaintiffs on
grounds that-plaintiffs had failed to prove actual impact of violations on receiving water
body).
5. P.Z.RG. v. Yak Induct. Znc., 757 F. Supp. 438, 443 (D.N.J.
1991).
6. CJ Siem Club v. Cedar Point Oil Corp., 73 F.3d 546 (5th Cu. 1996) (rejecting defendant's argument that a citizens' suit was unavailable where same discharges would have been
permitted under EPA permit guidelines, but affh+ng denial of injunctive relief).

ex
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Clean Water Act and is consistent with the Supreme Court's recognition of "procedural" standing in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.
First, this article will review the impetus and purposes for the
Clean Water Act of 1972, including its citizen suit provision, particularly as these purposes relate to the elimination of specific harm
or causation requirements in enforcement actions under its provisions. Second, this article will briefly review the basic elements of
Article I11 standing requirements as enunciated by the Supreme
Court, and the development of Supreme Court standing doctrine
in environmental cases leading up to and including the Defenders of
Wildlife decision. Then the article will survey the various approaches courts have taken in applying Article I11 standing doctrine
to Clean Water Act citizens enforcement suits. Finally, this article
will consider the effect of the Def&s
of Wildlife decision and other
Supreme Court standing doctrine on citizens enforcement standing
under the Clean Water Act. This review concludes that Supreme
Court standing doctrine, including the Defhuh of Wildlife decision,
supports a more inclusive approach to citizens suit standing than
that currently prevailing in the courts.

The federal Clean Water Act was enacted in 1972 in response to
the worsening pollution of the nation's waterways and dissatisfaction with the failure of its predecessor, the Water Quality Act,' to
provide effective controls on water pollution. The Clean Water Act
declared ambitious goals to make all of the nation's waters fishable
and swimmable by 1983, and to eliminate all pollutant discharges to
water by 1985:
The objective of this chapter is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters. In
order to achieve this objective it is hereby declared that, consistent with the provisions of this chapter
(1) it is the national goal that the discharge of pollutants into
the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985;
(2) it is the national goal that wherever attainable, an interim
goal of water quality which provides for the protection and
propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife, and provides for
recreation in and on the water be achieved by July 1,
1983. . .
7. Pub. L. No. 84234, 79 Stat 903.
8. CWA 5 101(a), 33 U.S.C.5 1251(a)(1994).
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The Clean Water Act was adopted out of frustration with the failure of the preexisting federal Water Quality Act to control water
p o l l ~ t i o n .Under
~
the Water Quality Act, pollution was prohibited
only to the extent that it caused a violation of water quality standards in the receiving water bodies.10 These standards were established by state water quality control boards. The scientific
uncertainty of tracing specific environmental impacts to particular
concentrations of pollutant discharges made these standards dificult to establish and even more difficult to enforce. Enforcement
of this prohibition was extremely problematic, as it was nearly impossible to prove, in any case, that a violation of water quality standards was caused by any one given polluter. Thus, each individual
source of water pollution could point its finger at other sources of
pollution to the same water body and say that the water body would
violate standards even if its own pollution was eliminated.
More fundamentally, the Water Quality Act assumed that the a p
propriate method of treating water pollution was simply to allow
dilution by the receiving water body, as long as that body had assimilative capacity remaining. The Senate Report on the Clean Water
Act noted the defects in this approach:
[Blecause of the great difficulty associated with establishing reliable and enforceable precise eMuent limitations on the basis of a
given stream quality, water quality standards, in addition to their
deficiencies in relying on the assimilative capacity of receiving
waters, often cannot be translated into effluent limitations-dependable in court tests, because of the imprecision of models for
water quality and the effects of effluents in most waters."
Due to these difficulties, the Water Quality Act was,as a practical
matter, unenforceable and ineffective. During the Senate debate
on the Clean Water Act, Senator Muskie noted that in over two decades under the prior enforcement regime, only one enforcement
case reached the courts, and that case itself took four years to prose-

9. Seegmmally Mark C. Van Putten & Bradley D. Jackson, The Dilution of the Clmn WaterAct,
19 U. Mich.J. Law.Ref. 863 (Summer, 1986); Frank P. Grad, Environmental Law $5 3.03[1] [2] (a-1) (1995).
10. Id
11. S. Rep. No. 92-414 (1972), @tinted in 1972 U.S.C.Ci4.N. 3668 and in 92d Cong. 2d
Sess. (1972) at 8, reprinted in Environmental Policy Div., Congressional Research Sew., Library of Congress, 93d Cong. 1st Sess., A Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972 at 1426 (Comm. Print 1973) (hereinafter cited as 1972 Legislative
History).
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cute from the initial enforcement conference required under the
Water Quality Act to the consent decree.12
The 1972 Clean Water Act sought to correct these philosophical
and practical defects in the previous water pollution control regime. Philosophically, Congress adopted the principle that "no one
has the right to pollute - that pollution continues because of technological limits, not because of any inherent right to use the nation's waterways for the purpose of disposing of wastes.*13 In order
to implement this principle practically, the Congress adopted a
blanket prohibition on all discharges of pollutants, whether or not
the discharge caused any demonstrable impact to the receiving
water body, except and unless the discharge was authorized by (and
in compliance with) a permit issued in accordance with its
provisions.
In order to implement the principle that pollution continues only
to the extent that existing technology makes its control infeasible,
the Clean Water Act establishes a system of permits that impose
technology-based effluent limitations.14 These effluent limitations
are based on available control technologies for various classes and
types of pollutant discharges, and for various industrial processes.
In addition, a system of water quality-based effluent limitations was
retained, so that any particular discharger is required to comply
with the more stringent of the two requirements - water qualitybased or technology-based.15
The intent of this fundamental change in the approach to regulation of pollutant discharges into the nation's waters was to redefine
enforceable water pollution restrictions without reference to measurable impacts on the ecology of the receiving water body. Congress sought, at the same time, to enhance enforcement of the
newly implemented pollutant discharge regulatory regime. Unlike
the Water Quality Act, the provisions of the Clean Water Act were
to be enforceable directly by the federal government in all circurn-

12. 117 Cong. Rec. 38799, reprinted in 1972 Legislative History, supra note 12, at 1257.
13. 1972 Senate Report at 42, reprinted in 1972 Legislative History, supra note 12, at 1425.
14. CWA 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (establishingeffluent standards based on best available
technology), 304, 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (requiring EPA to establish technology-based effluent
standards), 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (providing for permitting scheme for discharges requiring
compliance with effluent standards provided in §§ 301.33 U.S.C. § 1311, and 304,33 U.S.C.
§ 1314)(1994).
15. See CWA 302(a), 33 U.S.C. 1312(a)(1994).
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stances.16 And, like the then recently enacted Clean Air Act, the
Clean Water Act provided for citizens enforcement of its prohibitions against unpermitted discharges of pollutants:

. . . any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf (1) against any person . . . who is alleged to be in violation of
(A) an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or
(B) an order issued by the Administrator or the State with
respect to such standard or limitation . . . .I7

The "effluent standard [s] or limitation [s]" that may be enforced
by citizens are broadly defined to include any violation of the general prohibition against unpermitted discharge of pollutants, as
well as the violation of any permit or condition of a permit issued
under the Clean Water Act.18
More importantly, for the purpose of standing analysis, "citizen"
was defined, for,citizens enforcement purposes, to include "a person or persons having an interest which is or may be adversely affected."lg This provision was intended to grant standing to the
limits permitted by the Constitution, as stated in the Supreme
Court's decision in Sierra Club v. Morton.20 The Conference Committee report made this intention explicit: "the understanding of
the conferees [is] that the conference substitute relating to the definition of the term 'citizen' reflects the decision of the U.S.
~~
the
Supreme Court in the case of Sierra Club v. M ~ r t o n . "During
Senate Debate on the conference bill, Senator Muskie explained
this language as follows:
In the Sierra Club case, the Supreme Court was asked to interpret section 10 of the Administrative Procedures Act - 5 U.S.C.
section 702
which contains wording similar to that of section
505(g) of the conference bill. The Supreme Court emphasized
that "the interest alleged to have been injured may reflect aesthetic conservational and recreational as well as economic values

-

...

1,

16. CWA 5 309.33 U.S.C. 5 1319 (1994). The Water Quality Act permitted enforcement
by the federal government only where water quality of interstate waters fell below established
standards, pollutant discharges in one state endangered health or welfare in another state, or
where the governor of the state of discharge consented to the enforcement action. 33 U.S.C.
5 466g(c)(5), (d)(l), (g) (Supp. I 1965); =Van Putten &Jackson, supra n.lO, at 873 n.41.
17. CWA 5 505(a), 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(a)(1994).
18. CWA § 505(f), 33 U.S.C. 3 1365(0(1994).
19. CWA 5 505(g), 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(g)(1994).
20. 405 U.S. 727 (1972). discussed infia, text accompanying nn.2837.
21. S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1236 (1972). rrgnnted in 1972 U.S.C.CAN. 3776, 3823, and in
1972 Legislative History, supra note 12, at 281, 329.
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Thus it is clear that the under the language agreed to by the conference, a noneconomic interest in the environment, in clean
water, is a sufficient base for a citizen suit under section 505.
Further, every citizen of the United States has a legitimate and
established interest in the use and quality of the navigable waters of
the United States. Thus, I would presume that a citizen of the
United States, regardless of residence, would have an interest as defined in this bill regardless of the location of the waterway and regardless of the issue involved.22
The history and context of the 1972 Clean Water Act make clear
that Congress intended to substitute a regime of strict liability for
discharges of pollution in violation of its provisions for the pre-existing regime where proof of actual injury to a water body was required in order to establish a violation. At the same time, Congress
clearly intended this regime to be enforceable by those citizens who
used and enjoyed the affected water body aesthetically, recreationally, or for environmental well being. Courts have been struggling
since that time with the question whether the "injury-in-fact" requirement of Article I11 standing requires precisely the kind of
proof of actual impact on water quality, traceable to the discharger's own pollution, that Congress meant to eliminate in enacting the Clean Water Act. To understand the context of the
development of Clean Water Act citizens enforcement standing law,
a brief review of standing doctrine generally, and the Supreme
Court's pronouncements .on environmental standing in particular,
is appropriate.

Modem standing doctrine evolved in this century as an aspect of
the justiciability of cases in the federal courts created by Article I11
of the United States Constitution. While other aspects of justiciability, such as mootness, ripeness, and the political question
doctrine addressed the issue of what claims could be heard in federal court, standing doctrine addressed the question of who was entitled to bring a case or controversy to federal court.23 Early cases
22. Senate Consideration of the Report of The Conference Committee (Oct.4, 1972),
1972 Legislative History, supra n.12, at 221.
23. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,99 (1969) ("Thefundamental aspect of standing is that
it focuses on the party . . . and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated. [Tlhe
question . . . is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request
an adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is justiciable.")
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addressed this issue in the context of suits by citizens and taxpayers
who sought to challenge the constitutionality of Congressional enactments. As the doctrine developed, the Court broadened its a p
plication to include suits challenging agency action, and articulated
constitutionally required minima for standing as well as non-constitutional "prudential" limitations.
~ l t h o u g hstanding doctrine has generally been articulated as an
aspect of the Article I11 Section 2 grant of the judicial power to hear
"cases" and "controversies," the Court has also articulated a separation of powers concern throughout its discussion of standing.
Under the Court's Article I11 analysis of justiciability, the grant of
authority to the courts to determine "cases" and "controversies"
necessarily presupposes a notion that only parties with an appropriate interest in the issues presented for adjudication may seek the
court's assistance; in the absence of such an interest, there may not
be a genuine case for adjudication by the court, and the court is not
assured of sufficient adversity and interest of the parties in thoroughly presenting the issues to the court. In its separation of powers incarnation, the standing requirement is seen as a check on the
judicial system; a means of assuring that, by limiting the exercise of
the judicial power to genuine individual controversy brought by
parties with an individual interest in the subject matter, the exercise
of the judicial review function of the courts will not overpower the
legislative and executive branches of government.
The current "irreducible minimum" for standing was articulated
by the Supreme Court in V a l 4 Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State.24 In that case, the Court
denied standing to an organization of taxpayers complaining that
the @t of surplus United States government property to a Christian
religious college violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. The Court held that:
[A]t an irreducible minimum, Art. I11 requires the party who invokes the court's authority to "show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
putatively illegal conduct of the defendant," Gladstone, Realtors v.
Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979), and that the injury
"fairly can be traced to the challenged action" and "is likely to be
redressed by a favorable decision," Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Olg., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41 (1976). In this manner does
Art. I11 limit the federal judicial power "to those disputes which
24. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
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confine federal courts to a role consistent with a system of separated powers and which are traditionally thought to be capable of
resolution through the judicial process." Flast v. Cohen, 392
The Court went on to reject the notion of pure "citizenn standing, holding that the injury to "taxpayers" or "citizens" of a putative
violation of the establishment clause was too diffuse and non-particularized to support the individualized injury-in-fact it found to be
required by Article III.*6
The Vallqr Fmge Court thus restated what has become the familiar
three part test for Article I11 standing: injury-in-fact, causation, and
redressability. This test requires first, that the plaintiff have suffered a discrete, particularized "injury-in-fact" not shared with all
citizens generally. Second, the injury must be "fairly traceablen to
the conduct complained of on the part of the defendant, that is,
there must be some sort of causal relationship between the wrong
alleged and the injury suffered. Third, the injury be "redressable"
by a favorable decision by the court.
While this test is relatively easy to state, it becomes relatively difficult to apply, especially in the context of environmental standing.
Environmental wrongs tend to injure large numbers of people, and
might thus be characterized as "generalized grievances" by their
very nature. Environmental wrongs may cause impacts and injuries
that are not immediately perceptible or objectively quantifiable
under a literal interpretation of the term "injury-in-fact." Causation
in the tort law sense may be impossible to establish where the contributions of numerous, dispersed polluters combine to cause an
environmental injury. Similarly, redressability may become problematic where the elimination or limitation of just one source of
pollution will not resolve the overall polluted condition of a particular resource, or where adherence to a particular environmental
review procedure may or may not result in a different decision
about a proposed federal action with environmental consequences.
Perhaps because of the difficulty posed by these issues, environmental standing cases have played an important role in the development of the Supreme Court application of standing doctrine. As
will be seen, the Supreme Court has, at least until the Defenden of
Wildlife decision, accommodated standing doctrine to address the
problems of standing in environmental litigation.
25. Id. at 472.
26. Id. at 465.
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The United States Supreme Court has addressed environmental
standing in six cases since 1970, from the Sierra Club v. Morton case
in 1970 through Lujan v. D e f h of WiIdliJe in 1992.27 Throughout
this line of cases run certain common threads: while the Court has
not required a high threshold showing of environmental injury to
satisfy the "injury-in-factn requirement, and has explicitly recognized non-traditional injuries such as harm to aesthetic interests as
sufficient, the Court has strictly required that the putative litigant
demonstrate some physical or geographically proximate relationship with the resource affected. The Court has been markedly unfriendly to litigants who express an abstract interest in
environmental ideas and ideals unless this interest is physically
anchored to some tangible resource. The Court has also not required a strict showing of tort-style causation to satisfy the "fairly
traceable" and "redressability* requirements.
A. Environmental InjuryIn--Fact: The Morton Test Recognizing
Nontraditional Harm
The Supreme Court first addressed environmental standing in Sierra Club v. Morton, a case that is probably more significant for its
dicta and for Justice Douglas' memorable dissent than for its holding. In Morton, the Court rejected the Sierra Club's standing under
the Administrative Procedure Act to challenge a series of approvals
for development of a ski resort on federal lands in the Mineral King
area of the Sierra Nevada mountains. Sierra Club had sought to
rely solely on its organizational interest in national environmental
issues and wilderness preservation generally to assert standing, and
specifically disavowed reliance on the interests of any of its members who camped, hiked, or skiied in the area to be affected by the
development.28 The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Stewart, emphatically rejected the notion that "a mere 'interest in a
27. The cases are: Sierra Club v. M d o n , supra, United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973)
supra note 3; Duke Power Co., v. Carolina Envt'l Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978);Japan
Whaling v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986); Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n,
497 U.S. 871 (1990) (statutoly standing); and Lujan v. Defadm of WiIdlzP,supra note 3.
28. Morton, 405 U.S. at 736. The Sierra Club did, however, plead that "[olne of the principal purposes of the Sierra Club is to protect and conserve the national resources of thesierra
Nevada Mountains." 405 U.S. at 739 n.8.
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problem,' no matter how longstanding the interest and no matter
how qualified the organization is in evaluating the problem" would
be sufficient to establish the requisite injury or "aggrievement," at
least under the Administrative Procedures Act.29
While rejecting the abstract interest in environmental issues as a
basis of standing, however, the Court made equally clear that it
would recognize environmental standing even in the absence of injury to traditional legal interests, and even where the environmental injury was widely shared. The Court specifically recognized
aesthetic interests and "environmental well-being" as constihltionally cognizable interests:
[TI he complaint alleged that the development "would destroy or
otherwise adversely affect the scenery, natural and historic objects and wildlife of the park and would impair the enjoyment of
the park for future generations." We do not question that this
type of harm may amount to an "injury in fact" sufficient to lay
the basis for standing under 5 10 of the APA. Aesthetic and environmental well-being, like economic well-being, are important
ingredients of the quality of life in our society, and the fact that
particular environmental interests are shared by the many rather
than the few does not make them less deserving of legal protection through the judicial process.s0

Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court then went on to note with
approval the judicial trend "toward discarding the notion that an
injury that is widely shared is ips0 facto not an injury sufficient to
provide the basis for judicial review."sl
Justice Douglas' dissent suggested that the Court should recognize standing to sue in the name of the environmental resource
Noting that the courts had traditionally recognized the
standing of abstract entities and inanimate objects to sue in their
own name, in the form of corporate parties and vessels, Douglas
reasoned that environmental resources should themselves have
standing:
So it should be as respects valleys, alpine meadows, rivers, lakes,
estuaries, beaches, ridges, groves of trees, swampland, or even air
that feels the destructive pressures of modem technology and
modem life. The river for example, is the living symbol of all the
29. Id. at 735.
30. Id at 734.
31. Id. at 738.
32. For a recent decision recognizing the standing of an endangered species to sue in its
own name, see Loggerhead Turtle v. The County Council of Volusia County, Florida, 896 F.
Supp. 1170 (M.D.Fla. 1995).
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life it sustains or nourishes - fish, aquatic insects, water ouzels,
otter, fisher, deer, elk, bear, and all other animals, including
man, who are dependent on it or who enjoy it for its sight, its
sound, or its life. The river as plaintiff speaks for the ecological
unit of life that is part of it. Those people who have a meaningful
relation to that bodv of water - whether it be a fisherman, a
canoeist, a zoologist, or a logger - must be able to speak for the
values which the river represents and which are threatened with
destr~ction.~~
Justice Douglas then pointed out that the Sierra Club's uncontested allegation that "one of the principal purposes of the Sierra
Club is to protect and conserve the national resources of the Sierra
Nevada mountainsn was found by the District Court to be a sufficient basis of standing.34 Justices Blackrnun and Brennan also
dis~ented.~~
Justice Stewart's majority opinion and Justice Douglas' dissent
may not be that far apart philosophically. Like the majority,Justice
Douglas would require a "meaningful relationn between the individuals seeking to sue and the environmental resource they sought to
represent. Justice Douglas did not elaborate on why he felt that the
Sierra Club met this "meaningful relation" test in the Mineral King
case, but seemed to share with the majority the view that "[tlhose
who hike it, fish it, hunt it, camp in it, frequent it, or visit it merely
to sit in wonderment are legitimate spokesmen for [an environmental resource], whether they may be few or many.ns6
Despite the Justices' disagreement on the ultimate disposition of
the Mineral King standing question, the Sierra Club Court seemed to
resolve, at least initially, some of the tough issues of environmental
standing. The majority and dissent agreed that environmental injuries shared in common, and injuries to intangible interests such as
33. Mo7ton, 405 U.S. at 743.
34. Id. at 744. Justice Douglas does not elaborate whether he, too, found this allegation
sufficient to establish the requisite "meaningful relation" between the putative plaintiff and
the resource to be protected. Although it quotes this allegation, Justice Stewart's majority
opinion also does not address whether this corporate interest in the presenation of the Sierra Nevada mountains might be sufficient to establish the Sierra Club's standing in its own
right
35. Molton, 405 U.S. at 755-60. Justice Blackmun would have either remanded the case to
the District Court with instructions to permit Sierra Club to modify its pleading to assert the
individual interests of its members in using the Mineral King area, or would have expanded
standing doctrine to acknowledge the standing of sufficiently dedicated environmental
organizations.
36. Mortm, 405 U.S. at 744-45;$I Morton ("Nowhere in the pleadings or the affidavits did
the Club state that its members use Mineral King for any purpose . . . ."), at 735.

Heinonline - - 22 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 181 1997

aesthetic values and "environmental well-being" would suffice to establish injury-in-fact for standing purposes. Majority and dissent
also both seemed to agree that the standing of individuals seeking
to assert the protection of environmental resources would depend
on the existence of some sort of "meaningful relation" between the
plaintiff (or its members) and the resource affected.
Subsequent decisions of the Court would confirm the M d o n
Court's dicta recognizing harms to "environmental well-beingn and
aesthetic enjoyment of environmental resources as constitutional
"injury-in-fact." In United States v. S t u h t s Chahging Regulatoly
Agency Procedure97 (SCRAP) the Court affirmed a holding that an
environmental organization had standing based on its members' allegations that they "use[d] the forests, rivers, streams, mountains,
and other natural resources surrounding the Washington Metropolitan area [for] . . . camping, hiking, fishing, sightseeing, and
other recreational [and] aesthetic purposes" and a claim that the
rail freight rate increases it sought challenging would reduce recycling, increase litter, and increase consumption of natural
resources.S8
Perhaps more significantly (at least as far as environmental injury
is concerned), in Duke Power Company v. Carolina Envimnmental Study
Cmup, I ~ C the
. , ~Court
~ upheld a finding of constitutional standing
for a group of residents living in close proximity to planned nuclear
generating facilities to challenge the Price Anderson Act.* The
plaintiffs had claimed that nuclear generating facilities would cause
various environmental and economic impacts, including:
(a) the production of small quantities of non-natural radiation
which would invade the air and water; (b) a "sharp increase" in
the temperature of two lakes presently used for recreational purposes resulting from the use of the lake waters to produce steam
and to cool the reactor; (c) interference with the normal use of
the waters of the Catawba River; (d) threatened reduction in
property values of land neighboring the power plants; (e) "objectively reasonable" 'present fear and apprehension "regarding the
effect of the increased radioactivity in air, land and water upon
[appellees] and their property, and the genetic effects upon
their descendants"; and ( f ) the continual threat of "an accident
37.
38.
39.
40.

412 U.S. 669 (1973).
Id. at 678.
438 U.S. 59 (1978).
71 Stat 576, 42 U.S.C.

5 2210. The Price Anderson Act limited liability of nuclear
power facilities. Id. Plaintiffs in the Duke Pwer case challenged this liability limitation on
constitutional due process and equal protection grounds.
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resulting in uncontrolled release of large or even small quantities
of radioactive material" with no assurance of adequate compensation for the resultant
The Court upheld this finding of sufficient "injury-in-fact," specifically relying on thermal pollution of the lakes and exposure to nonnatural radiation:
It is enough that several of the "immediate" adverse effects were
found to harm appellees. Certainly the environmental and aesthetic consequences of the thermal pollution of the two lakes in
the vicinity of the disputed power plants is the type of harmful
effect which has been deemed adequate in prior cases to satisfy
the "injury in fact" standard. See United States v. SCRAP,supra. Cf:
Sierra Club v. Mmton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972). And the emission
of non-natural radiation into appellees' environment would also
seem a direct and present injury, given our generalized concern
about exposure to radiation and the apprehension flowing from
the uncertainty about the health and genetic consequences of
even small emissions like those concededly emitted by nuclear
power plants.42
The Duke Power Court's reliance on "exposure to non-natural radiation" and the effects of thermal pollution on lakes is telling. The
Court did not require the plaintiffs to prove, even as a matter of
scientific possibility, that the levels of "non-natural" radiation they
would be exposed to would cause any increased risk of illness to
them; it was sufficient that the exposure was "non-natural" and was
a matter of scientific uncertainty. The Duke Court also did not require that the injury claimed by the plaintiffs be the same as that
addressed by their substantive claim; after all, the Duke Power plaintiffs were asserting an essentially economic substantive claim (deprivation of the right to recover full compensation for injuries in the
event of a nuclear accident), not a claim for environmental protecti0n.~3In addition, the' Duke Power standing holding was based on
four days of factual hearings on the standing issue,44so, unlike Morton and SCRAP, the standing issue in Duke Powerwas presented on a
fully developed factual record and not at the pleading stage.
41. Duke Power Company, 438 U.S. at 73 (quoting district court opinion, 431 F. Supp. 203,
209 (W.D.N.C. 1977).
42. Id. at 7374.
43. Id. at 68. Indeed, the l h k e Power Court specifically rejected the assertion that plaintiffs
be required to establish the "nexus"between the injury claimed and the constitutional provision allegedly violated as was required of those asserting taxpayer standing. Id. at 78-81; see
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
44. Duke Pown; 438 U.S. at 72.
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Two other Supreme Court decisions, although not directly bearing on Article I11 standing, warrant mention. The Supreme Court
again upheld environmental standing in Japan Whaling Association v.
Ama'can Cetacean Society,45where the Court stated, in a footnote,
that an organization whose members engaged in whale watching
and the study of whales had alleged a sufficient "injury-in-fact" to
challenge the Secretary of Commerce's failure to sanctionJapan for
violating the ~nternationbWhaling Commission quotas." Then in
1990, in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federati~n,~~
the Supreme Court
issued its first ruling since Mmton denying environmental standing,
although it did so as a matter of statutory standing under the Administrative Procedure Act rather than as a matter of constitutional
standing under Article 111.
In National Wildlife Federation, the Court found that the National
Wildlife Federation had failed adequately to allege that its members
were "among those injured" where the affidavits submitted in s u p
port of standing established only that its members used small portions of vast areas opened up for mineral development by
challenged "withdrawal" determinations by the United States Forest
Service.4* The plaintiff asserted that its members used federal lands
for recreation "in the vicinity of" the National Forest lands that had
been opened to mineral development, but failed to assert that the
individual members actually used any portion of the lands actually
opened for development within the vast national forest areas identified (2.5 million acres and 5.5 million acres).49 According to the
Court, the NWF plaintiffs had failed to show that they used the actual environmental resources that would be affected by the challenged determination, and thus failed to establish that their
asserted injuries fell within the "zone of interests" protected by the
statute, as required for a judicial review action under the Administrative Procedure Act.50
Thus, the NWF plaintiffs, like the Sierra Club in S h a Club v.
Morton, had failed to show that they were themselves "among those
injured by the challenged action. This line of Supreme Court
cases dealing with standing "injury" can be broken down into two
45. 478 U.S. 221 (1986).
46. Id. at 286 n.4.
47. 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
48. Id. at 886-887.
49. Id. at 885-887.
50. Id. at 882483, 888.
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threads - the first dealing with the kinds (and degree) of environmental injuries that the Court will recognize as sufficient to confer
Article I11 (or statutory) standing, and the second dealing with the
relationship between the putative plaintiff and the resource affected. The Supreme Court has been quite willing to recognize
non-traditional injuries, such as injury to aesthetic or recreational
interests, and even uncertain injuries, such as the exposure to unnatural radiation in Duke Power. The Court has, however, strictly
required the putative plaintiff to establish its "meaningfid relationship" to the environmental resource affected, and has insisted that
this relationship be concrete, and not abstract. Thus, an abstract
interest in an environmental issue has uniformly been rejected, as
have interests in vast regions without identification of the use of the
specific area affected by the decision challenged.

B.

Causation and Redressability: SCRAP and Duke Power.

The causation and redressability elements of standing are related. Establishment of the causal relationship between the conduct complained of and the constitutional injury complained of will
often subsume the determination of whether a Court order enjoining such conduct will provide relief to the plaintiff. The Court
has not, however, at least up to the Def&
of Wildlife decision,
required a showing of strict tort causation in the sense that the
complained of conduct be the but-for cause of the plaintiffs harm.
To the contrary, the Court has been willing to accept quite attenuated theories of causation, at least at the pleading stage.
Thus, in SCRAP, the Court accepted plaintiffs' allegation that the
challenged increase in freight rates would increase the cost of transporting recycled materials, thus discouraging recycling, leading to
increased consumption of raw materials as well as increased litter.51
Plaintif& alleged that some of this increased littering, as well as
some of the increase in logging and mineral development, would
occur in national parks and forests in the Washington, D.C. area,
interfering with plaintiffs' members' enjoyment of those resource~.~*
Plaintiffs also alleged that the increased use and processing of raw materials would increase pollution of the air breathed by
their members.5S While noting that pleading of causation must be
51. SCRAP, 412

U.S.at 68889.

52. Id. at 678, 688.
53. Id. at 678.
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more than an "ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable," the
Court determined that plaintiffs had adequately pleaded specific
harms to their members flowing from the rate increase.S4 Significantly, the Court also acknowledged that what suffices at the pleading stage would not necessarily suffice for summary judgment: "If,
as the railroads now assert, these allegations were in fact untrue,
then the appellants should have moved for summaryjudgment on
the standing issue and demonstrated to the District Court that the
allegations were sham and raised no genuine issue of f a ~ t . " 5 ~
The Court also accepted a relatively attenuated standing theory
in Duh Power c0.5~
There, plaintiffs claimed, and the District Court
had found, that without the liability limitations of the Price-hderson Act, nuclear power plants could not economically be constructed in plaintiffs' locality, and plaintiffs would be spared the
environmental impacts of local nuclear power plants.57 The Court
found sufficient support for this finding in the testimony of plaintiffs' experts, as well as the testimony presented by nuclear industry
proponents during hearings on the Price-Anderson
The
Court also rejected the defendants' claim that plaintiffs be required
to disprove the possibility that, even in the absence of Price-hderson, nuclear power plants would have been constructed by the federal government instead of private industry.59
COURTCONSIDERATION
OF CLEAN
WATER
ACT
IV. SUPREME
CITIZEN
SUITSTANDING.
Although the United States Supreme Court has never directly
confronted the question of citizen suit standing to enforce requirements of the Clean Water Act, dicta in two Supreme Court decisions
shed light on some of the Court's assumptions about the application of Article I11 requirements to citizens enforcement suit cases.
In the first case, Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea
CZummers,* the Court appears to reject the possibility of universal
citizens enforcement standing, while in the second case, Gwaltnq, of
Id. at 688.
Id. at 689.
S u m n.40.
Id. 438 U.S. at 7478.
Id. at 7577.
Id. at 77-78.
60. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
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Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay F~undation,~'
the Court seems to assume
that violation of a Clean Water Act is itself the injury-in-fact that
supports standing. These decisions are discussed below.
A.

National Sea Clammers

In National Sea Clammers, a coalition of commercial fisherman
sued the Middlesex County Sewerage Authority and other polluters
seeking damages for injuries to their economic interests resulting
from pollution of water in violation of federal law (including, inter
alia, the Clean Water
The plaintiffs asserted claims under
an implied private right of action under the Clean Water Act.63
The Third Circuit had held that the fishermen plaintiffs were entitled to seek such damages and that an implied private right of action was neither preempted by nor inconsistent with the citizen suit
provisions of the Clean Water
In reaching this conclusion, the Third Circuit reasoned that the
Clean Water Act citizen suit provision did not preclude a private
right of action because the citizen suit provision provided an explicit remedy for those potential plaintiffs who had not suffered any
compensable injury that would give rise to a cause of action.65
Thus, the citizen suit provision, according to the Third Circuit, was
meant for those plaintiffs who had not suffered injury from the pollution, while those who had suffered injury could still pursue common law remedies and an implied right of action.66
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there is no private
right of action for damages under the Clean Water Act. In doing
so, it explicitly rejected the Third Circuit's conclusion that the citizen suit provisions were meant for plaintiffs who had not suffered
any injury:
In fact, it is clear that the citizen-suit provisions apply only to persons who can claim some sort of injuly and there is, therefore, no
reason to infer the existence of a separate right of action for "injured plaintiffs. "Citizen"is defined in the citizensuit section of
the FWPCA as "a person or persons having an interest which is or
may be adversely affected." § 505(g), 33 U.S.C. $j1365(g). It is
clear from the Senate Conference Report that this phrase was
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

484 U.S. 49 (1987).
Nat'l Sea Clummers, 453 U.S.at 4 5 & n.6.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 9.
Nat'l Sea Clummers h ' n v. City @New York,616 F.2d 1222, 1227 (3d Cir. 1980).
Id.
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intended by Congress to allow suits by all persons possessing
standing under this Court's decision in Sierra Club v. Mmton, 405
U.S. 727,92 S.Ct. 1361,31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972). See S. Conf. Rep.
No. 92-1236, p. 146 (1972). This broad category of potential
plaintiffs necessarily includes both plaintiffs seeking to enforce
these statutes as private attorneys general, whose injuries are
"noneconomic" and probably noncompensable, and persons
like respondents who assert that they have suffered tangible economic injuries because of statutory violation^.^^

B.

Gwaltnq of Smithjield

In Gwaltnq, the Court addressed primarily the statutory interpretation question of whether a citizen-plaintiff could bring a Clean
Water Act suit for wholly past violations of the Act. The Court held
that citizens could not so enforce the Act for past violation^.^^ It
read the use of the present tense in the statutory provision that suit
may b e commenced against any person "who is alleged to be in
violation of a n effluent standard o r l i m i t a t i ~ n to
" ~require
~
a good
faith allegation of ongoing violations at the time suit is commenced.'O It stopped short, however, of requiring @of of ongoing
violations as a jurisdictional matter.71
In explaining this conclusion, the Court implied that ongoing violations were also necessary to establish standing, and that failure
to prove an ongoing violation at summary judgment o r trial would
defeat citizen suit standing:
Petitioner contends that failure to require proof of allegations
under !j 505 would permit plaintiffs whose allegations of ongoing
violation are reasonable but untrue to maintain suit in federal
court even though they lack constitutional standing. Petitioner
reasons that if a defendant is in complete compliance with the
Act at the time of suit, plaintiffs have suffered no injury remediable by the citizens suit provisions of the Act. Petitioner, however,
fails to recognize that our standing cases uniformly recognize
that allegations of injury are sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction
of a court. . . . This is not to say, however, that such allegations
may not be challenged. In United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669,
689 (1973), we noted that if the plaintiffs "allegations [of standing] were in fact untrue, the [defendants] should have moved for
summary judgment on the standing issue and demonstrated to
67. Nut? Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 1617.
68. Gwaknq,, 484 U.S. at 56-63.
69. CWA § 505(a) (1). 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1) (1994).
70. Gwaknq,, 484 U.S. at 56-60.
71. Id. at 6467.
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the District Court that the allegations were sham and raised no
genuine issue of fact." If the defendant fails to make such a
showing after the plaintiff offers evidence to support the allegation, the case proceeds to trial on the merits, where the plaintiff
must prove the allegations in order to prevail.72

Justice Scalia's concurring opinion (joined by Justices O'Connor
and Stevens), made the point more explicitly: in the view of these
Justices, there could be no injury-in-fact once the violation of the
Clean Water Act had ceased:
If it is undisputed that the defendant was in a state of compliance
when this suit was filed, the plaintiffs would have been suffering
no remediable injury-in-fact that could support suit. The constitutional requirement for such injury is reflected in the statute
itself, which defines "citizen" as one who has "an interest which is
or may be adversely affe~ted."'~
This assumption that an ongoing violation is the essence of injury-in-fact for standing purposes in a Clean Water Act citizen suit
may ultimately have great significance, for it presumes that the statutory violation is itself the "injury" that justifies court intervention,
and not the demonstrable consequences of the violation to the receiving water body. Clearly, the impacts of water pollution do not
subside immediately upon the elimination of the source - toxic
levels of pollutants, emissions of heavy metals, and biological oxygen demand may continue to destroy habitat, kill fish, or render
fish unsuitable for fishing or eating for months, years, or even decades after the discharge of pollution has ceased.74 If, as Justice
Scalia maintains, "injuryn exists only as long as the violation continues, then the violation itself must be the presumptive injury, and
not its scientifically uncertain consequences to the water body.

It was against this backdrop of generally receptive environmental
standing decisions that the Supreme Court decided the Lujan v.
72. Id. at 65-66.
73. Id. at 70.
74. Consider the impact of PCB discharges by General Electric on the Hudson River.
Although these discharges largely ceased by 1976, commercial fishing of most fish in the
Hudson River is still banned, and health advisories for recreationally fished Hudson River
fish are still in effect due largely to General Electric's emissions. If injury-in-fact consists of
the demonstrable impacts of the statutory violations on concrete interests, then it is impossible to understand how this injury-in-fact would be lacking for recreational and commercial
users of Hudson River fish simply because General Electric stopped pouring more poisons
into the river.
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Defenders of Wildlife case in 1992. In Defhder-s of Wildlife, the Court
reversed the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals' finding that the Defenders of Wildlife had standing to protect endangered species located in foreign countries from habitat destruction caused by
United States financed projects.
Defenders of Wildlife had sued to challenge a change in Department of Interior regulations that removed the Endangered Species
Act consultation r e q ~ i r e m e n twith
~ ~ respect to United States-financed projects on foreign soil.76 The District Court had granted
summaryjudgment to the defendant, the Secretary of the Interior,
on the grounds that Defenders of Wildlife lacked standing.77 The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, and would have found

tand ding.'^
Defenders of Wildlife asserted three standing theories. First, it
relied on the individual standing of two of its members, one who
had in the past visited the habitat of the endangered leopard and
Asian elephant in Sri Lanka, and another who had in the past visited the habitat of the endangered Nile crocodile in Egypt.79 Both
of these habitats were threatened by United States Agency for International Development-financed projects.80 Both of these individuals testified that they intended and hoped to return to these locales
in the future and seek to view the endangered species in question,
but neither had immediate plans to do so.81
Second, Defenders of Wildlife relied on what it called the "ecosystem nexus approach" - the theory that its members who use any
part of world ecosystem have a cognizable interest in the whole
ecosystem, and suffer an injury when any part of that globally interwoven system is injured.82
Third, Defenders of Wildlife relied on what it called the "animal
nexus approach" - that people interested in study of the endangered animals have a cognizable interest in protecting the species
they are interested in worldwide, even if they have no plans to visit
the habitat.83 Related to this theory, Defenders of Wildlife also re75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)(1994).
Defendm of Wldlzfe, 504 U.S. at 558559.
Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 658 F. Supp. 43,4748 (D. M i n . 1987).
Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1035 (1988).
Defendm of Wfi504 U.S. at 563-564.
Id. at 563-564.
Id
Id. at 565566.
Id. at 566.
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lied on its members whose interest in the species that were
threatened was professional, rather than avocational, in nature.84
In addition, Defenders of Wildlife relied on its own organizational interest in the procedures guaranteed by the Endangered
Species Act for the preservation of endangered species generally.B5
In reversing the Eighth Circuit's finding of standing, the Court
focused primarily on the same question presented by the Sierra Club
v. Morton case: that is, whether the plaintiff had adequately demonstrated that it was itself among those injured by the conduct complained of by the defendant.86 Justice Scalia's sweeping opinion for
the majority, however, contains much language that has caused
concern for citizen enforcement plaintiffs, and that seems to pull
back from the generally accommodating Supreme Court standing
doctrine in environmental cases.
The majority's broad language is tempered, somewhat, by the exceptions Justice Scalia himself recognizes, implicitly and explicitly,
to the strict "inju~y-in-fact"and "causation" requirements that he
articulates. The holding is also tempered by the terms of the concurring opinion written by Justice Kennedy and joined by Justice
Souter, as well as by the dissenting opinion of Justice Marshall
(joined by Justice O'Conner), and the concumng opinion of Justice Stevens (who would have found standing but reversed on the
merits).

A. Justice Scalia's Majority Opinion on Injury-in-Imt
The opinion for the Court rejected each of Defenders of Wildlife's standing theories. In doing so, Justice Scalia's majority opinion restated the "irreducible minimum" of constitutional standing
in terms that, at least on their face, seemed to pull back from two
decades of environmental standing doctrine.87 Justice Scalia easily
rejected the standing claims of those of Defenders of Wildlife's
members who expressed a hope to return at some indefinite time
to the threatened habitats of the endangered species in question.88
To the majority, the likelihood that these plaintiffs would in fact be
exposed to the harms caused by the defendant's failure to consult
concerning impacts of United States-funded projects in these far84. Id.
. 85. Id. at 571-572.
86. Id. at 562-567.

87. Id. at 560-61.
88. Id. at 564.
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flung areas was too remote and speculative to warrant adjudication
of the merits of plaintiffs' claims.89
On the facts presented, this holding is not startling, as the Article
I11 sufficiency of the interest of individuals who had visited an environmental resource once in their lives and hoped someday to return is at least a debatable proposition. Even Justice Douglas might
question whether such individuals had established the "meaningful
relationship" with the environmental resources in question as he
would have required in his Sierra Club v. Mmton dissent.
In reaching this conclusion, however, Justice Scalia's opinion restates the standing requirements in terms more onerous to the environmental plaintiff than previous Supreme Court decisions. Thus,
despite prior decisions that recognized standing for intangible interests, such as aesthetic values, and for environmental injuries
which were widely shared by many members of the public, Justice
Scalia's dictum requires that the claimed injury in fact be "concrete
and particularized."g0 Similarly, in rejecting the "ecosystem nexus"
theory of standing, Justice Scalia raised the ante for constitutional
injury-in-fact. Instead of simply rejecting Defenders of Wildlife's
claim that the entire world is one recognizable ecosystem giving any
person with an interest in one part of the world ecosystem standing
to sue with respect to any other portion of the world ecosystem, the
Court phrased its holding in terms of the level of harm required to
establish "injury-in-fact":
To say that the [Endangered Species] Act protects ecosystems is
not to say that the Act creates (if it were possible) rights of action
in persons who have not been injured in fact, that is, persons who
use portions of an ecosystem not perceptibly affected by the unlawful action in question.g1

Justice Scalia thus reads a "perceptible [elffect" requirement into
the concept of injury-in-fact. This "perceptibility" requirement a p
pears to pull back substantially from such decisions as Duke Power
Company, which recognized exposure to non-natural radiation as an
injury-in-fact without requiring a showing that such exposure would
cause a perceptible health effect in the plaintiffs.
Similarly, the majority rejected the "animal nexus" and "vocational nexus" claims, finding a lack of perceptible harm to plaintiffs
who had an interest in an animal species but could demonstrate no
89. Id.
90. Id. at 560.
91. Id. at 566.
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likely contact with the individuals of that species who might be
harmed by the challenged government action.9* CitingJapan Whaling Association, Justice Scalia characterized as "the outermost limits
of plausibility" a claim of perceptible harm by an individual interested in study of a species in the same region of the world, in which
that species is threatened by the government action challenged, as
facing perceptible harm.gs
As with the plaintiffs who only infrequently visited the area affected, rejection of standing for the "animal nexusn and "vocational
nexusn plaintiffs does not represent that much of a departure from
the Court's previous standing decisions. Right from the Sierra Club
v. Morton case, the Court has been unsympathetic to standing based
on claims of an interest or expertise in ideas or issues. Rejection of
standing based on a vocational or avocational interest in the species, but not in the individual animals physically affected by the
challenged conduct, is consistent with the Court's previous a p
proach, which had emphasized the relationship between the plaintiff and the physical resource affected.

B. Justice Scalia s' Plurality Opinion Concerning Redressability
In addition to finding insufficient injury-in-fact to support Article
I11 standing, Justice Scalia would have rejected Defenders of Wildlife's claims of redressability as well. According to Justice Scalia's
opinion, because Defenders of Wildlife chose to attack the Department of Interior's general policy statement instead of individual
agency actions funding the challenged activities abroad, there was
insufficient certainty that the funding agencies would be bound by
a change in the Department of the Interior consultation policy ordered by a court.94 If the funding agencies did not follow the consultation requirement, a change in the requirement would not have
any effect on the projects funded.95 Similarly, according to Justice
Scalia, Defenders of Wildlife had failed to show that withdrawal of
United States aid for the challenged projects - which constituted
only ten percent of the cost of the Sri Lankan project - would
actually result in the abandonment of the projects and avoidance of
the feared impactseg6
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 566-67.
Id.
Id. at 56869.
Id.
Id. at 580 (Kennedy,J. cmmmng).
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This "redressabilityn portion of Justice Scalia's opinion gained
only a four-vote plurality of the Court, however. Justices Kennedy
and Souter declined to join this part of the opinion, opining that
the injury-in-fact issue was dispositive and that the Court need not
reach the issue of redre~sability.~'
C.

T h Court's Discussion of "ProceduralInjury"

A majority of the Court also rejected the Court of Appeals' finding that the Defenders of Wildlife had established standing based
on a purely procedural injury.98 The Court acknowledged that
Congress, in enacting the Endangered Species Act, had authorized
"any person" to commence an action to enforce the provisions of
the ESA against any other person, including the United States Government, alleged to be in violation of its provi~ions.~g
But, relying
specifically on the separation of powers underpinnings of constitutional standing doctrine, Justice Scalia's opinion emphatically rejected the ability of Congress to define new procedural injuries as
being sufficiently substantial to satisfy constitutional standing.lOO
This section of the Defenders of Wildlife opinion probably has the
greatest importance for the future application of standing doctrine
to Congressionally created citizens enforcement actions. In rejecting the concept of a Congressionally created "procedural" right,
shared equally by each citizen and equally enforceable by each, the
Court saw no difference between allowing "any citizen" to enforce
Congressionally created statutory duties of government officials and
allowing any citizen a right to require the government to comply
with general constitutional requirements. To allow Congress to do
so would, according to Justice Scalia, "permit Congress to transfer
from the President to the courts the Chief Executive's most important constitutional duty, to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed,"'101and "would permit the courts, with the permission of
Congress, 'to assume a position of authority over the governmental
acts of another and coequal departrnent.'"lO*
But in the course of rejecting such purely procedural rights, the
Court's opinion acknowledged some distinctions, and implied
97. Id.
98. Id. at 571678.
99. Id. at 571-72; sec 16 U.S.C.5 1540(g).
100. Id at 577 (quoting U.S.Const Art. 111, 53).
101. Id. at 577 (quoting U.S.Const. Art. 11, 1 3).
102. Id at 577 (quoting Mossuchusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S.447,489 (1923)).
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some others, that may ultimately be the salvation of the citizens enforcement suit. First, the Court explicitly acknowledged that procedural rights can be created and enforced if the citizen-enforcer has
some "concrete interest" in the subject matter of the procedure in
question.lOs Thus, a person who is about to have a federal facility
constructed next door will have standing to enforce the NEPA requirement that an environmental impact statement be prepared
first.104 In recognizing such "procedural" rights, the Court also acknowledged that procedural rights are "special" in at least one respect. According to footnote seven of the Def&
of Wildlife
opinion, the plaintiff who asserts procedural rights "can assert that
right without meeting all the normal standards for redressability
and irnmedia~y."~05
Thus, the procedural plaintiff need not show
that adherence to the correct procedures would actually result in a
more favorable decision to her, or that the challenged action would
not nonetheless be taken.
Second, implicit in the relaxed standards for standing of a plaintiff who claims a procedural injury coupled with a "concrete interest" in the subject matter is a relaxed requirement for showing
injury-in-fact resulting from the decision challenged. Justice Scalia
posits that the individual residing next to a pr6posed federal facility
has standing to challenge the environmental review procedures followed in approving the facility, without stating a requirement that
the nextdoor neighbor establish that the proposed facility will
cause her "discrete" and "perceptible" injury.lo6 Such an injury is
presumed.
More explicitly, the Court recognized the "procedural" standing
of an organization specifically organized around the protection of a
particular environmental resource, again without a specific showing
of "perceptible" injury to the organization or its members. Thus, in
distinguishing Methow Val@ Citizens Council v. Regional Farester,l07 (a
case in which the Court had seemed to assume, without discussion,
the standing of the plaintiff organization), the Court stated "we did
not so much as mention standing [in Methow], for the very good
reason that the plaintiff was a citizens' council for the area in which
103. Id at 572 n.7.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 572 n.7.
106. Id. at 572 & n.8 (members of neighborhood association would "obviously be concretely affected").
107. 833 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1987).
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the challenged construction was to occur, so that its members
would obviously be afFected."l08
Finally, also in its discussion of Congressionally defined procedural rights, the Court offhandedly dropped a tantalizing suggestion of a distinction that could potentially expand citizens
enforcement standing substantially. In holding that "injury-in-fact"
on the plaintiffs part remained part of the irreducible minimum of
Article I11 (and separation of powers) standing, the Court suggested
that a different rule might apply if the suit were not against the
government, but against a private violator of a Congressional act.
According to the Court, "it is clear that in suits against the government, at least, the concrete injury requirement must remain."log
This possible distinction is also suggested by the Court's distinction
of qui tam actions in its discussion of the concrete injury
requirement.' lo
Although the Court's rejection of purely procedural injury as a
basis for standing has some troubling implications for citizens enforcement standing, Justice Scalia's majority opinion leaves considerable room for the continued vitality of citizens enforcement suits.
First, Defenden of Wildlife leaves room for Congressionally created
citizens' "procedural" standing where the citizens have a concrete
of
interest in the environmental resource at issue. Second, Def&s
Wildlife acknowledges a presumption of standing for citizens groups
composed of citizens in the area affected by the government action.
Finally, Defenhs of Wildlife suggests the possibility of broader standing where suit is brought not against the government, but against a
private actor.

D. Jzlstice Kennedy's Separate Acknowledgement of Congressional
Authority to Articulate N m Injuries-in-Fact
Although joining all but the redressability discussion of Justice
Scalia's opinion, Justice Kennedy (joined by Justice Souter) wrote a
separate concurrence in order to emphasize his view that standing
doctrine must be sensitive to changes and not be limited to common law doctrines of injury. Citing the Amem'can Cetacean Society de108. Defendm of WIdh@,504 U.S.at 573 n.8.
109. Id. at 578.
110. Id. at 572-73 (discussion of "the unusual case"where Congress has created a concrete
private interest by providing for a cash bounty); seegenerally Sunstein, s u p , note 2, at 170-177
(discussing history of qui tam actions) & 232-234 (suggesting system of cash bounties to give
printe plaintiffs Article 111 stake in enforcement litigation).

Heinonline - - 22 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 1 9 6 1 9 9 7

19971

Clean Water Act Standing

197

cision, Justice Kennedy suggested that he would not completely
foreclose the possibility of an "animal nexusn or "ecosystem nexusn
approach to standing on stronger facts. Nor was congress without
the authority to expand the scope of standing. It had simply failed
to articulate the proper basis for doing so in the Endangered Species Act citizen suit provision. According to Justice Kennedy:
In my view, Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy
where none existed before, and I do not read the Court's opinion to suggest a contrary view. . . . In exercising this power, however, Congress, at the very least, must identify the injury it seeks
to vindicate and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled
to bring suit. The citizensuit provision of the Endangered Species Act does not meet these minimum requirements, because
while the statute purports to confer a right on "any person . . . to
enjoin . . . the United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency . . who is alleged to be in violation of any
provision of this chapter," it does not of its own force establish
that there is an injury in "any person" by virtue of "any
violation."ll1

.

Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Souter, thus recognizes some
Congressional leeway to expand the scope of injury-in-fact, so long
as Congress articulates a rationale for defining some class of affected plaintiffs. This principle offers more than a ray of hope for
the continued vitality of the citizens' enforcement suit, particularly
in the Clean Water Act case, given that the class of "citizens" who
can commence a suit is specifically limited to those citizens who
"[have] an interest that is or may be adversely affected." As the
swing votes for the majority, this position, combined with the positions of the three Justices who would have found standing, represents the majority view of the Court.

E. Jutice Stevens' Concurring Opinion Finding Standing
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment only, finding standing
but reversing on the merits of the foreign project consultation issue."* According to Justice Stevens, the plaintiffs satisfied the concrete interest requirement by having visited the habitats at issue in
the past or having a professional or avocational interest in the species in question, without necessarily having to show a future intent
111. Defenders of WldIrjk,504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy,J. concum'ng).
112. Id. at 581-89 (Stevens,J. cuncummng).
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to revisit the habitat.lls Stevens likened the nature of plaintiffs' interest to that of one family member in the well-being of another:
one need not have a definite future intention to visit one's family
member to suffer a loss if injury to that family member should occur.l14 Similarly, Justice Stevens found the "imminence" requirement to be satisfied by the imminence of the harm to the habitat in
question, without requiring any imminent intention to return to
the habitat.115 Stevens also found the redressability requirement to
be satisfied, as the Executive Branch could be expected to follow an
authoritative interpretation of the Endangered Species Act by the
Supreme Court.l16

F. Justice Blackmun s' Dissent
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice O'Conner, also would have
found that the plaintiffs in D$&s
of WiZdlife had standing.117
Blackmun found sufficient evidence in the record that the plaintiffs' intention to return to the threatened habitat was genuine to
survive a motion for summaryjudgment, and felt that requiring the
plaintiff to iden* a date certain for their return was an "empty
formality,"ll8 akin to requiring a plaintiff claiming a decline in
property values to prove the date he intended to sell his property,
or an employment discrimination plaintiff to prove the date she
would be ready to start work.llg Justice Blackmun would also accept the ecosystem nexus and animal nexus approaches to standing, recognizing that environmental harms may affect ecosystems
spread out across the globe, and that one with a professional interest in a species suffers a loss upon the loss of wild populations of
that species.120 Justice Blackrnun rejected the plurality's redressability holding: the funding agencies would be bound by the
Court's ruling not only because it would be the last word on the
subject, but also would be collaterally estopped because of their virtual participation in the litigation.121
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 583-84.
Id. at 584 n.2.
Id. at 582-83.
I d at 58485.
Id. at 589-606 (Blackmun,J. dissenting).
Id. at 592.
Id. at 593.
Id. at 59495.
Id. at 595-98.
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Justice Blackmun also wrote extensively concerning Congress'
ability to grant procedural rights, and noted that in the modern
administrative state, Congress does not simply legislate in the "black
and whiten of mandates and prohibitions, but in "procedural shades
of gray."122These procedures, such as the National Environmental
Policy Act,123as well as the Endangered Species Act, are designed to
protect some environmental interest. Justice Blackmun responds to
the separation of powers concerns expressed by the majority by
pointing out that Congress' choice of enacting procedural requirements as opposed to substantive mandates is designed to maximize
executive discretion, and not to aggrandize Congress at the expense of the executive.124 Blackmun acknowledged that "[tlhere
may be factual circumstances in which a Congressionally imposed
procedural requirement is so insubstantially connected to the prevention of a substantive harm that it cannot be said to work any
conceivable injury to an individual litigant."125 But Justice Blackmun apparently found a sufficient link to potential injury under the
ESA procedures to find standing in Defenders of Wildlije.126
Despite Defenders o l Wildlife's rejection of standing in the case
before it, and despite some sweeping language in Justice Scalia's
opinion for the majority, there is substantial common ground between Justices in the majority and in the dissent, and certain s u p
port for Congressionally articulated rights that will give rise to
injury in fact. Indeed, comparing the concumng opinions of Justice Kennedy (joined by Souter) and Stevens and the dissenting
opinion of Blackmun (joined by 07Conner), there is apparent
agreement among a majority of the Justices then on the Court for
the proposition that Congress may define new injuries as long as it
articulates some link to potential injury to an individual litigant, as
well as for the proposition that a vocational or avocational interest
in an animal species may, under some circumstances give rise to
standing without a showing of actual physical exposure to the
threatened individuals of the species.

122. Id. at 602.
123. 42 U.S.C. 55 43214370(d).
124. D e f a d m of WiIdItife, 504 U.S. at 604 (Blackmun,J. aksenting).
125. Id. at 606.
126. Curiously,Justice Blackmun expressed no opinion on the merits of plaintiffs' claim,
or whether he would affirm or reverse on the merits. It is thus not clear whether Blackmun's
ultimate position was any diierent from that of Justice Stevens.
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Moreover, even Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court leaves s u b
stantial territory left to citizens enforcement standing in its explicit
acknowledgement that so-called "procedural* rights may exist and
give rise to injury-in-fact without necessarily showing the causal connection otherwise required, and its tantalizing suggestion that suits
not against the government are different.

VI. THESPECTRUM
OF APPROACHESTO CLEAN
WATER
ACT
CITIZENS
ENFORCEMENT
STANDING
The Clean Water Act's citizens enforcement provisions were initially lightly used.l27 However, by the 1980s, several environmental
organizations launched programs for the systematic enforcement of
Clean Water Act requirements using the citizen suit vehicle,l28 and
much of citizens enforcement suit standing doctrine developed in
this period - following the Supreme Court's decisions in Mort012
(1972), SCRAP (1973), and Duke Power (1978), but before the
Court's decision in Lujan v. D@&s
of Wildlife (1992). The range
of possible approaches to citizens enforcement standing range
from the strictest possible approach, taking the elements of "injuryin-fact" and "causation" literally to require a citizen-plaintiff to establish a scientifically measurable harm to a resource with an
equally demonstrable impact upon an individual plaintiffs enjoyment of that resource, to the concept of universal citizens standing,
that is, the concept expressed by Senator Muskie that every citizen
of the United States, regardless of geographic location, has a shared
interest in the integrity of the nation's waters sufficient to create a
justiciable case or controversy against a violator of Clean Water Act
provisions.
At least prior to Defendem of Wildlife, no court had embraced
either of these extremes. However, various courts have discussed
these approaches in the course of developing their approach to citizen suit standing. These courts have developed additional, intermediate approaches, resulting in a spectrum of citizens
enforcement standing doctrine. This spectrum includes, from
strictest to most liberal, the "causation-in-fact" approach, the "parameter" approach, the "resource-based approach, and the "universal standing" approach. These approaches, and the courts'
127. SeeJeffrey G. Miller, Citizen Suits: Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control
Laws § 2.3 (Wiley & Sons, 1987).
128. Id. at 11-15.
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treatment of them both before and after the Defenders
cision, are discussed below.
A.

20 1

of WiIdlife de-

The Causation-in-Fact Appoach

As noted, the most stringent possible approach to Clean Water
Act enforcement standing would take the Article I11 requirements
of "perceptible inju~y-in-fact,""causation," and "redressability" at
their most literal. Thus, a plaintiff might be required to plead
(and, at summary judgment or trial, to offer proof) that pollution
of a waterway has scientifically demonstrable impacts that are detrimental to that plaintiffs use of the water body, such as actual mortality rates in fish or other species of recreational value, actual
health risks to humans swimming or fishing in the waterway, or actual, observable aesthetic impacts. In addition, and more problematically, the plaintiff could be required to prove that these injuries
are "causally related" to the Clean Water Act violations in a "but for
cause" sense - that is, that in the absence of the defendant's violations, the observed and proven detrimental impacts would not have
occurred. Similarly, in order to meet the strictest possible application of the "redressabilitynrequirement, the plaintiff might be required to prove that the elimination of the defendant's own
contribution to pollution of the water body in question would alleviate the specific detrimental impacts of which the plaintiff
complains.
Such an approach would pose insurmountable obstacles for
many Clean Water Act citizen suits. The Clean Water Act explicitly
rejected a regulatory regime in which dilution of pollutants by the
receiving water body excused the polluter from compliance in favor
of a strict liability regime in which all additions of pollutants to the
water body, regardless of impacts, are banned. Under this regime,
many clear cut violations of the Clean Water Act will not have scientifically demonstrable impacts on fish or other aquatic organisms.
For example, the first industrial or municipal discharger on a pristine lake might commence discharging pollutants without a permit,
or in excess of technology-based permit limits, but without any immediately measurable, or even imminently measurable, impact on
the aquatic ecosystem due to the initial assimilative capacity of the
water body. The Clean Water Act clearly intends to make such violations enforceable immediately, and not only after proof of damage to the ecosystem arises.
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Beyond the problem of proving measurable damage to the
aquatic ecosystem, the problem of proving actual causation would
prove even more insurmountable. Even where a water body is so
grossly polluted that the effects of pollution are readily observed
and scientifically measured, proof of the source of the particular
pollution causing the impacts, or that one particular discharger is
the "but-for" cause of the pollution impacts on a water body with
many dischargers, may be all but impossible. Precisely these
problems of proof in enforcement cases are what led the Congress
to reject the Water Quality Act in favor of the Clean Water Act.
This inevitable contradiction between Congress' strict liability regime in enacting the Clean Water Act, and the stated "injury" and
"causationn elements of standing doctrine have lead those courts
that have considered arguments for this stringent "causation-infactn test to reject it. For example, in Public Inwest Research Group of
New Jmq,
v. Powell Duffiyn Terminals, Inc.,lZ9the Third Circuit rejected an argument for strict proof of causation, explicitly relying
on the purposes of the Clean Water Act as well as Article 111:
Plaintiffs need not show "to a scientific certainty" that the oil they
saw came from [defendant's] effluent. This tort-like causation is
not required by Article I11 and is apparently an attempt by [defendant] to negate the strict liability standard of the Act. Since
the Act forecloses [defendant] from raising such an argument at
the liability stage, [defendant] attempts to raise it under the
guise of standing.
Other courts have similarly rejected arguments for strict proof of
causation to establish Clean Water Act enforcement standing.lsl
It is obviously not a complete answer to the Article 111 standing
inquiry to state that a requirement of strict proof of causation
would negate the statutoly requirements of strict liability for Clean
Water Act violations. D e f e n h of Wildlife suggests that the Constitution imposes some limit on the extent to which Congress, by legislation, may define the outer limits of standing. D e f i s of WiZdlife
itself did not directly address the kind of causation and "injury-infactn issues that arise in Clean Water Act suits, but its language
might be read to support a strict approach to determination of the
issues of "injury" and "causation."
129. 913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990).
130. Id. at 73 n.lO.
131. See P.LRG. v. AT&T Bell Labs., 617 F. Supp. 1190 (D.N.J. 1985); Chesapeake Bay
Found., Inc. V. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 608 F. Supp. 440 (D. Md. 1985).
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The Parameter Appfoach

Some of the courts that have rejected arguments for application
of a strict "injury" and "causationnapproach have adopted a middle
ground that, in effect, requires proof of a perceptible injury and
then presumes a causal relationship between the injury and the violation as long as there is some plausible connection between the
violation and injury. Under this approach, the Clean Water Act citizen-plaintiff must establish that pollution of a water body causes
perceptible impacts on her enjoyment of that water body - for
example, that visible oil slicks or turbidity in the water offend her
aesthetically, or that toxic pollutants have killed fish or wildlife or
resulted in health advisories against consumption of fish - that
interfere with her regular enjoyment of the water body.
Next, the plaintiff must establish that the kinds of impacts identified are caused by the kinds of permit violations complained of.
Thus, specific permit parameters must be associated with specific
kinds of perceptible environmental impacts - that is, violations of
oil and grease parameters are related to oil slicks, and violations of
toxics standards may be correlated with killing of wildlife or health
advisories against fish consumption. To this extent, the "parameter" approach is similar to the strictest "causation-in-fact" test, i n
that the plaintiff must identify specific environmental harms that
have had a perceivable impact on her, and causally relate these impacts to the complained of conduct. The "parameter" approach
stops short, however, of requiring proof that it was the defendant's
own pollution that in fact caused the plaintiffs injuries, and thus
avoids the most serious problem of a strict application of "injury-infact" and "causation" requirements of standing doctrine.
The leading case for the "parameternapproach is P.I.RG v. Powell
Duffiyn Tminals, Inc.lS* In PoweU D u b n , the Third Circuit upheld
the standing of individual members of an environmental organization, based on their regular use of the affected water body (the Kill
Van Kull), and their aesthetic offense at the sight of oil sheens on
the water, the brown color of the water, and the bad odors emanating from the water.lss The defendants submitted expert affidavits
asserting that the defendants' discharges could not, to a scientific
certainty, affect the water quality of the Kill Van Kull in the vicinity
of the park used by the plaintiffs, and that the Kill Van Kull was so
132. 913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990).
133. Id at 71.
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polluted by other sources of pollution that elimination of the defendant's discharges would not perceptibly improve the water quality of the Kill Van Kull anywhere.'% In other words, the Powell
Duffryn defendants relied upon precisely the scientific causation arguments that were successfully used to stymie enforcement efforts
under the Water Quality Act, and which Congress specifically
sought to eliminate by adopting the strict liability scheme of the
Clean Water Act.
As noted above, the Third Circuit emphatically rejected this attempt to perform an end run around the Clean Water Act's strict
liability scheme under the guise of Article I11 standing. The court
also, however, rejected an approach that would have found any violation of a permit provision presumptively to satisfy the injury and
causation requirements.ls5 Instead, the court announced the parameter-based approach to Clean Water Act standing:
Although we agree that a permit exceedence alone is not suBcient to establish the second prong of Vallq,Forge, the facts are
sufficient here to trace PIRG's injuries to PDT's discharges.
The requirement that plaintiff's injuries be "fairly traceable" to
the defendant's conduct does not mean that plaintiffs must show
to a scientific certainty that defendant's effluent, and defendant's
effluent alone, caused the precise harm suffered by the plaintiffs.
A plaintiff need not prove causation with absolute scientific rigor
to defeat a motion for summaryjudgment. The "fairly traceable"
requirement of the VaUqr Forge test is not equivalent to a requirement of tort causation. Cf. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmmtal St+ Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 78, 57 L.Ed. 2d. 595, 98 S.Ct.
2620 (1978).
The standing requirement ensures that parties will not "convert the judicial process into 'no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of concerned bystanders."' Vallq,
Forge, 454 U.S. at 473 (quoting Unikd States v. SCRAP, 412 US.
669, 687, 37 L.Ed. 2d 254, 93 S.Ct. 2405 (1973)). In order to
demonstrate that they are more than "concerned bystanders,"
plaintiffs need only show that there is a "substantial likelihood"
that defendant's conduct caused plaintiffs' harm. Duke Power Co.,
438 U.S. at 75 note 20 (1978). In a Clean Water Act case, this
likelihood may be established by showing that a defendant has 1)
discharged some pollutant in concentrations greater than allowed by its permit 2) into a waterway in which plaintiffs have an
interest which is or may be adversely affected by the pollutant
134. Id. at 72.
135. Id.
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and that 3) this pollutant causes or contributes to the kinds of
injuries alleged by the plaintiffs.ls6
Significantly, this approach does not require proof that the actual
pollutants from the defendant's facility caused the specific harm to
the plaintiff. The plaintiff need only establish that the types of pollutants emitted by the defendant in excess of its permit limitations
caused the types of injuries suffered by the plaintiff. Thus, it was
sufficient for the plaintiff in Powell DufJiyn to establish that he suffered aesthetic injuries due to the effect of an oily sheen on the
surface of the water of Kill Van Kull, and that Powell Duffryn Terminals was exceeding its permit limitations for oil and grease. Because oil and grease exceedences cause the kind of injury suffered
by the plaintiff, there was sufficient causal relation between his injury and his stake in the suit, and the violation complained of to
satisfy the causal relationship test.ls7
The Powell , D u h n court also considered the "redressability" requirement of standing doctrine. The court found the causal relationship between the defendant's discharges and general pollution
conditions sufficient to establish redressability: "If [Powell Duffryn
Terminals] complies with its permit, the pollution in the Kill Van
Kull will decrease."ls* The court also recognized that the deterrence effect of a civil penalty assessment would support redressability; that is, that the collection of penalties from Powell Duffryn
Terminals, as authorized by Clean Water Act section 505, would
serve both general and specific deterrence purposes - reducing
future pollution of the waterway both by Powell Duffryn and by
other would be polluters.lsg
Several other courts have adopted the Powell Duffryn "pararnetermbased approach, and this approach may fairly be said to be the
prevailing test for standing in Clean Water Act cases.'* The "pa136. Id
137. Id at 73.
138. Id
139. Id The Third Circuit cited several other decisions that have also recognized the
redressability function sewed by assessment of civil penalties. See Chesapeake Bay Found.,
Inc. v. Gwalmey of Smithfield, Ltd., 890 F.2d 690, 695 (4th Cir. 1989); Sierra Club v. Simkins
Indus., Inc., 847 F.2d 1109 (4th Cir. 1988), c&. denied 491 U.S. 904 (1989); P.I.RG. v. AT&T
Bell Labs, 617 F. Supp. 1190, 1200.01 (D.N.J. 1985).
140. Sz, e.g., Save Our Community v. E.P.A., 971 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1992); N.RD.C. v.
Watkins, 954 F.2d 974 (4th Ci. 1992); P.LRG. v. Shell Oil Co., 840 F. Supp. 712 (N.D. Cal.
1994); Concerned Area Residents for the Environment v. Southview Farm, 834 F. Supp. 1410
(W.D.N.Y. 1993). rev2 on other grounds,34 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1994); cert. denied, 115 S. C t 1793
(1995).
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rarneter" based approach provides a workable compromise for a p
plication of Article I11 standing doctrine to Clean Water Act citizen
suits, and avoids the worst contradictions that a literal application
of the "causation" and "redressability" requirements might bring. It
does not, however, provide a completely satisfactory solution to the
problem of Clean Water Act citizens enforcement standing. It does
not address violations other than permit exceedences or parameter
excursions, such as reporting requirements, or failure to obtain a
permit in the first pIace.141
By maintaining the requirement of an injury that is objectively
perceivable by the plaintiff, the parameter approach still falls short
of the Clean Water Act's goals of providing for vigorous enforcement before the effects of pollution have reached the stage that
they are observable by the unaided senses. Under the Powell D u f f n
approach to standing, a permit holder with a plant on an otherwise
unpolluted lake or river could violate its permit with impunity until
the "assimilative" capacity of the receiving water body was exhausted. A user of the lake or river might not be able to show the
kind of injury contemplated by Powell D u h n until the water was
seriously polluted, and foul odors, dead fish, or oily sheens might
be readily observed. In other words, the Clean Water Act citizens
enforcement "medicine" would be unavailable until the patient was
dead, or at least grievously ailing. This was not the intent of Congress in specifically rejecting the Water Quality Act approach of
non-regulation of water pollution until after the assimilative capacity of the water body was reached.

C. Resource-Based Approach
Other courts have taken an approach more consistent with the
wording of the Clean Water Act citizen suit provision, and with its
legislative history. Picking up on the focus in Sierra Club v. Morton
on the regular use of an environmental resource for recreational,
aesthetic, or other environmental purposes, these cases recognize
standing in any individual who demonstrates an "interest which is
or may be adversely affected" by showing regular recreational use of
141. Some courts have found their way around the problem of reporting violations by
finding a Congressionally created "informational"right, invasion of which is a separate injury. See, e.6, P.LRG. v. Yates Indus. Inc., 757 F. Supp. 438, 443 (D.N.J.
1991). Recognition
of Congressionally created "informational"rights as sufficient to create an injury-in-fact to
support Article I11 standing ought to support a broader view of standing for permit violations
as well.
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the water body, without requiring a showing of specific injury perceivable by the plaintiff or traceable to the defendant, other than
the contribution of pollutants to the water body.
This approach to the standing question might be dubbed the "resource-based approach, as it focuses on the plaintiffs interest in
the resource affected by the defendant's contribution of pollutants,
and not on specific impacts of pollution. The leading c&e for this
approach is NRDC v. Outboard Marine Corp.14*In Outboard Marine,
NRDC relied on the standing of its members who lived adjacent to,
walked along, and swam in the waters that received Outboard
Marine's discharges. NRDC sought to challenge Outboard
Marine's exceedence of its discharge limitations for PCBs, but did
not submit evidence of any specific harm suffered by its individual
members due to PCB pollution. The court rejected Outboard
Marine's motion for summaryjudgment on standing grounds:
OMC argues those affiants fail to satisfy the standing requirements of such cases as M d o n by not demonstrating through
their affidavits and later depositions that they have personally suffered an injury from OMC's putatively illegal discharges. OMC
characterizes NRDC's members as merely concerned about pollution of the affected waterways generally, with their alleged injuries neither fairly traceable to OMC's conduct nor redressable by
the relief sought in this case. Understandably, OMC cites no case
in which a court has held similar showings insufficient for standing under the Act. Its argument stems from a basic misunderstanding of the type of injury NRDC and its members need to
demonstrate. It is enough for NRDC to show its members use
the water into which OMC's allegedly illegal discharges flow (see,
e.g., Siara Club v. SCM Cqb., 747 F.2d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1984)
(standing could be established by "a concrete indication that Sierra Club or one or more of its members used the Wolcott Creek
tributary or would be affected by its pollution")). Such standing
is not undermined because NRDC's members have not explicitly
said they are harmed by OMC's permit violations. It is enough
that they identify harm to their aesthetic or environmental interests from the overall pollution of the waterways. If OMC is
proved to be violating the terms of its permit, that alone constitutes injury to those using the affected waters (seeP.I.R G. v. Georgia Pacific C*.,
615 F. Supp. 1419, 1424 (D.N.J. 1985) ("The
Clean Water Act presumes unlawful discharges to reduce water
quality because definite proof of the proposition is often nearly
impossible") ) .

142. 692 F. Supp. 801 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
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Any requirement that NRDC must prove its members are
harmed by discharges specifically traceable to OMC would "virtually emasculate the citizen's suit provision by making it impossible for the plaintiff to demonstrate standing" Cksapeah Bay
Found. v. Bethleha Steel Cmp., 608 F. Supp. 440, 446 (D. Md.
1985)). Indeed, such a causation standard would compel a
stricter showing for standing than for liability under the Act,
where proof of a permit violation is sufficient. (Gemgia Pmjic,
615 F. Supp. at 1424). Thus NRDC demonstrates the necessary
link between OMC's activities and the identified injury to
NRDC's members as long as it can prove OMC's permit violations. Relatedly it follows that proof of such violations will suffice
to couple the redress of NRDC's members' injuries with this
Court's enjoining or penalizing of the vi~lations.'~~
Like the approach of both the majority and Justice Douglas's dissent in the Sierra Club v. Mdon case, the resource-based approach
to standing focuses on the relationship of the plaintiff to the resource affected, or potentially affected, by the defendant's conduct,
rather than focussing on observable harm to the resource. As the
court cogently explains in OMC, this approach does the greatest
justice to the Clean Water Act's strict liability scheme as well as its
grant of standing to "any person having an interest which is or may
be adversely affected," and the explicit references in the legislative
history to the Mdon test. Although the OMC court's recognition
that proof of a permit violation "alone constitutes injury to those
using the affected waters" has been explicitly rejected by the Third
Circuit in Powell Duff~n,the Second Circuit, at least implicitly, and
other courts, more explicitly, appear to have adopted the OMC resource-based approach.
The OMC court's rejection of any requirement that plaintiffs
prove an observable impact on the water body or their use and enjoyment of it in order to establish standing is clearly most consistent
with the Clean Water Act's strict liability approach to water pollution and the Act's rejection of the water quality-based approach of
143. Id. at 807-08.
144. See Friends of the Earth v. Consol. Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1985); Sierra Club
v. SCM Corp., 747 F.2d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1984)(dicta); Atl. States Legal Found. v. Universal
Tool, 735 F. Supp. 1404, 1411 (N.D. Ind. 1990); Ark. Wildlife Fed'n v. Bekaert Corp., 791 F.
Supp. 769, 775776 (W.D. Ark. 1992). The Fourth Circuit has also suggested, in dicta, that
recreational use of the affected water body was by itself sufficient to satisfy the "injury-in-fact"
requirements of standing doctrine. Chesapeake Bay Found. v. American Recovery Co., 769
F.2d 207, 209 (4th Cir. 1985); see aLFoSierra Club v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 847 F.2d 1109, 1112
& n.3, 1113 (4th Cir. 1988) (one member of organization who hiked near impacted water
body sufficient to support standing).
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the Water Quality Act. But does this test survive Justice Scalia's reasoning in D e f i s of WiIdlije that, in order to be constitutionally
cognizable, a claimed Article I11 injury-in-fact must be "concrete,"
"particularized," "perceptible," and "tangible"? For reasons explained below, this author believes that the resource-based approach to standing not only survives Defenders of WiIdliJe, but gains
support from it.

D.

Universal Standing

Taken literally, the Clean Water Act's declaration that "any citizen" may commence an action to enforce its prohibitions against
water pollution could be read to grant universal enforcement standing, at least as a statutory matter, to any citizen of the United States,
regardless of her geographical location or use of the water body
affected. Of course, the Clean Water Act's definition of the term
"citizen" limits its scope to those persons having an interest "which
is or may be adversely affected," and Senator Muskie's explicit reference to the Morton decision seems to demand an interpretation that
limits enforcement standing to those with some special relationship
to the affected water body. Senator Muskie also stated, however,
that the standing provision was meant to grant standing to the
outer reaches permitted by the Constitution, and he specifically
cited the example of a citizen of one state whose interest in enforcement of the environmental laws generally would suffice to allow
him to enforce the Clean Water Act even against a violator in a
remote state.
Although this legislative history suggests some Congressional intent to grant universal enforcement standing, efforts to invoke such
standing have been almost completely unsuccessful in the courts.145
For example, in Sierra Club v. SCM C ~ q b . , the
' ~ ~Second Circuit emphatically rejected Sierra Club's effort to rely on its general interest
in environmental enforcement (as it had sought to do in Morton),
and suggested instead that to establish standing Sierra Club had to
identify some members who used the water body in question. As
noted above, in the National Sea Clammers case the United States
Supreme Court also rejected the argument that the citizen suit pro145. But seeMetro. Washington Council for Clean Air v. Disaict of Columbia, 51 1 F.2d 809
(D.C. Cir. 1975).
146. 747 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1984).
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vision of the Clean Water Act was meant to provide an action for
plaintiffs' without injury-in-fact.14'
Of course, the Defenders of Wildlife decision appears to foreclose
the constitutional permissibility of a Congressional grant of enforcement standing to persons without injury-in-fact, "in suits
against the government, at least." One commentator has declared
the concept of citizens enforcement to be dead after Defenders of
WiIdlife.l48 But Def&
of Wildlife's implicit reservation of judgment concerning suits not against the government - i.e., private
enforcement suits against private violators - leaves at least a crack
in the door open for private attorneys general to enforce Clean
Water Act requirements without proof of individual interest in the
water body affected.

VII. D ~ N D E R
OFTw ~ ~ 1S
iIMPACT
w
ON CITIZEN
SUITSTANDING
Despite Defenders of Wildlife's sweeping language, the decision certainly has not settled issues of citizens enforcement standing under
the Clean Water Act. Post-Def&s
of Wildlife standing decisions
run a gamutjust as wide as the pre-Defenden of Wildlife decisions did.
Although the strict "causation-in-fact" approach has garnered a little more judicial support since Defenders of Wildlife than it enjoyed
before, courts have also reaffirmed the parameter approach as well
as the resource-based approach to standing subsequent to D$&s
of Wildlife. The Def&
of Wildlife decision has neither tolled the
death knell for citizens enforcement litigation, as predicted by
some, nor has it promoted clarity or predictability in the standing
tests applied to citizens enforcement suits.
A. P o s t - D e f i of Wildlife Support for Resource-Based Standing
At least one decision subsequent to Defenders of Wildlife has suggested that recreational and aesthetic use of a receiving water body,
combined with the violation of the Clean Water Act's permitting
requirement, suffices to establish injury-in-fact for standing purposes, without a showing that the water body has suffered observable pollution impacts. In Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil,149the Fifth
Circuit upheld the standing of an environmental organization to
challenge un-permitted discharges of water into Galveston Bay by
147. Nut? Sea Clammen, 453 U.S. at 1617.
148. Sunstein, sup4 note 2 at 164166.
149. 73 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. h i e & 117 S. Ct. 57 (1996).
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an oil well, based on the interests of its members who used Galveston Bay for swimming, canoeing, and bird-watching, and who lived
near Galveston Bay. The court's opinion applied a resource based
approach to injury-in-fact, focusing primarily on the relationship of
plaintiff's members to the water body affected by the discharge
rather than on the observable injuries to the water body. The court
reasoned:
Cedar Point makes much of the fact that the affiants expressed
"concern" that the discharge of produced water will impair their
ability to engage in recreational activities. Such language, Cedar
Point argues, stated only an interest in eliminating produced
water discharges into Galveston Bay, and not an injury in fact.
We find no merit in this contention. Whether the affiants were
"concerned or "believed or "knew to a moral certainty" that
produced water would adversely affect their activities on the bay
is a semantic distinction that makes little difference in standing
analysis. The requirement that a party demonstrate an injury in
fact is designed to limit access to the courts to those "who have a
direct stake in the outcome," Valley Forge Christian Colkge, 454 U.S.
at 473 (quoting Siara Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740, 31 L.Ed.
2d 636, 92 S. Ct. 1361 (1972)), as opposed to those who "would
convert the judicial process into 'no more than a vehicle for the
vindication of the value interests of concerned bystanders."' Id.
*quoting United Stales v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669,687,93 S. Ct. 2405,
37 L.Ed. 2d 254 (1973)). Sierra Club's affiants are concerned,
but they are not mere "bystanders." Two of the *ants live near
Galveston Bay and all of them use the bay for recreational activities. All of the affiants expressed fear that the discharge of p r e
duced water will impair their enjoyment of these activities
because these activities are dependent upon good water quality.
Clearly, Sierra Club's affiants have a "direct stake" in the outcome of this 1 a w ~ u i t . l ~ ~
This holding is a strong articulation of a resource-based a p
proach to standing. The plaintiff demonstrated its "stake" in the
controversy by showing its interest in the waters into which the pollutants were deposited and this stake was injury enough to support
standing.151 The Fifth Circuit did not, however, attempt to square
this result with the approach to standing taken by the Supreme
Court in Defkndm of Wildlife. In fact, the Defenders of Wildlife decision
is not cited or discussed by the Cedar Point Oil court.
150. Id. at 556.
151. The court did go on, as an alternative holding, to note that at least one of the plaintiffs affiants complained of actual degradation of water quality in Galveston Bay, including
discolored water, oil, and grease. Id. at 556557.
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B. Cases Reafinning the Powell D u h n Parameter-Based Approach
Despite its non-literal application of the causation and redressability elements of Article I11 standing articulated in Defenders of
Wildlife, several circuits have reaffirmed the Powell D u h n "parameter" based approach to standing. The Third Circuit itself so ruled
in N.RD.C. v. Texa~o.~~*
More recently, the Fifth Circuit cited Powell
Dufhn approvingly in affirming Clean Water Act enforcement
standing for an organization whose members used the affected
body of water for recreational activities including swimming, canoeing, and bird watching, and one of whose members claimed to be
offended by malodorous and discolored water in the general vicinity of the defendant's discharge.153
The Eastern District of Texas has also explicitly applied the Powell
D u h n approach to affirm the standing of an organization whose
members were recreational users of a body of water several miles
downstream from the body of water of the defendant's discharge.'" In a case brought by Friends of the Earth against Chevron, the District Court rejected the Chevron's argument that
because its discharge constituted less that 0.17% of the flow into the
lake used by the plaintiffs members, it could not possibly be the
cause of pollution impacts observed by the Friends of the Earth's
members. The Court quoted Powell Duffin's suggestion that the
plaintiff need not prove causation to a scientific certainty. The Dis152. 2 F.3d 493 (3d Cir. 1993).
153. Cedar Puint Oil Co.,73 F.3d 546. Although the Cedar Point court purported to apply the
PuweU-Duhn test to affirm standing based on-the claims of the
one member who
could point to perceptible pollution of the receiving water body, some of the language in this
opinion is more consistent with a broader, resource-based approach to standing, as discussed
supra, text accompanying notes 145144. The Cedar Point decision also holds explicitly that
citizens have standing to bring an enforcement action against an unpermitted discharge in
violation of the Clean Water Act permitting requirements even where the discharger could
have discharged the same amount of pollutants with a permic "Because Cedar Point does not
even have a permit for its discharges of produced water, any discharge exceeds that which is
allowable under the CWA" Id. at 558. This is an important principle for standing, as the
Clean Water Act prohibits any discharge "except in compliance withn its permitting provisions. Under this reasoning, any discharge without a permit, or under a permit whose provisions are otherwise being violated, is anillegal discharge, and pollution-injuries of the son
related to the discharge are injuries that support standing, whether or not those discharges
exceed the amounts that might have been permissible had the permit been complied with.
See ako Atl. States Legal Found. v. Karg Bros., Inc., 841 F. Supp. 51, 55 (N.D.N.Y. 1994)
(holding that violation of pretreatment regulations supports standing on the part of users of
river into which sewage pretreatment plant discharges, even though violation did not result
in exceedence of any permit parameter by the sewage treatment plant).
154. F h d r ofthe Earth v. Chnmm Chem. Co., 900 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Tex. 1995).
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trict Court also relied on the deterrence effect of a penalty judgment to support its finding that the redressability requirement is
satisfied.155 The District of New Jersey, Northern District of Ohio,
and District of California have also applied the Powell Dufhn test,
since Defenders of Wildlife, to find standing on the part of users of
water bodies downstream from the challenged discharge.156 In so
doing, both the Ohio and California courts distinguished Defhders
of Wildlife on its facts.
Interestingly, none of these other decisions reaffirming the parameter standing approach discussed Lujan v. Def&
of Wildlife or
considered whether that decision had changed the constitutional
standing requirements applicable to citizens enforcement suits.
C.

"CausatimL-in-Fact" Test

A few courts addressing enforcement standing issues since the
Defenders of Wildlife decision have moved towards demanding stricter
proof of a demonstrably perceptible change in the water body (or
other environmental resource affected) and the violation complained. For example, in Fn'ends of Earth v. Crown Cent. Petrol.
Corp.,l5' the Eastern District of Texas rejected a claim of standing
by a group of birdwatchers challenging oil and grease discharges to
a lake, finding insufficient evidence of an imminent perceptible
harm that could be causally related to the violations complained of:
Greene and the Pilgrims explained that pollution in Lake Palestine could cause extinction of certain species of birds due to the
magnification of its toxic effects as it rose through the food
chain, the birds being the top predator in the food chain. However, what FOE fails to do is establish that any injury to its members' birdwatching pursuits is imminent. FOE's designated
members noticed no reduction in the wildlife population or any
adverse conditions to Lake Palestine which might indicate that
such a reduction was imminent. FOE presents no evidence of
perceptible harm, FOE merely maintains that pollutants could
accumulate over time. A possibility that pollutants might eventually accumulate and perhaps cause harm does not constitute an
155. In a later decision, after trial, the F.O.E. v. C h m court ultimately rejected FOE's
organizational capacity to represent the individuals identified as its members, as the organization lacked formally defined membership criteria. F7iendc of the Earth v. C h m 919 F.
Supp. 1042 (E.D. Tex. 1996).
156. Cabjiaia Pub.Znt. Research Group V . SheU Oil
840 F. Supp. 712 (N.D. Cal. 1994)
(distinguishing Lujan); N.RD.C. v. Vygen Corp., 803 F. Supp. 97 (N.D. Ohio 1992) (distinguishing Lujan); P.I.RG. v. N.J. Expressway Auth., 822 F. Supp. 174 (1992).
157. No. 6:94 CV 489, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16338 (E.D. Tex. Sep. 22, 1995).

w.,
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injury that is "certainly impending." Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495
U.S. 149,158, 109 L.Ed. 135, 110 S.Ct. 1717 (1990). "Standing is
not an 'ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable,'
but . . . requires, at the summaryjudgment stage; a'factual showing of perceptible harm." Lujan II, 112 S.Ct at 2139 (citations
omitted). FOE has failed to show an actual or imminent injury.
Because no injury-in-fact has been established, there can be no
representational standing.15*
This approach seems hard to reconcile with the decision by the
same court in Friends o f t h Earth v. Chamm C h i c a l Co.
More recently, in Public Interest Research Group of NJ v. Magnesium
Elektron, I ~ C the
. , 'Third
~ ~ Circuit vacated a judgment in favor of
plaintiffs after trial in a Clean Water Act citizens enforcement case,
even though the court had previously affirmed summaryjudgment
in favor of the plaintiffs on the standing issue. The court reasoned
that the plaintiffs' failure to contradict testimony of the defendant's
trial expert to the effect that the admitted permit violations had no
observable negative impact on the receiving water body was a failure of proof on. the fundamental jurisdictional issue of standing,
and required vacation of the judgment despite the court's earlier
ruling. Citing Lujan, the court reasoned that Congressional intent
to remove the injury element from the Clean Water Act violation
could not overcome the "case or controversy" requirements of the
Constitution. The Third Circuit also rejected caims that the plaintiffs were injured by the knowledge of the existence of pollution
and that the threat of future effects of the identified pollution
was
too remote to satisfy an "imminent" injury standard.
Although the court recognized its earlier Powell Duffin decision,
it distinguished that case on the grounds that the Powell DufJiyn
plaintiffs had at least identified observable impacts of pollution on
the receiving water body. Despite uncontradicted testimony that
plaintiffs' members were recreational users of the affected water
body, the court rejected standing on the grounds that the water was
not yet polluted.
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania also seems to have moved
towards a "causation-in-fact" approach to standing, at least under
the analogous citizen suit provisions of the Clean Air Act. In Ogden
Projects, Inc. v. N m Morgan LandJill Company,160that court rejected
the standing of an individual plaintiff who sought to challenge the
158. Id at 22-23.
159. U.S. App. LEXIS 20846 (3d Cir. 1997).
160. 911 F. Supp. 863 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
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failure of a landfill to obtain a Clean Air Act permit for its emissions
of ozone-causing air contaminants. The plaintiff, although residing
85 miles from the facility, did reside and recreate in the same ozone
transport region as the facility, as determined by EPA, which region
was in non-attainment of air quality standards for ozone. Nevertheless, the court rejected his individual standing, citing his failure to
offer proof that it was the defendant's pollutant emissions that
caused his air quality impacts:
The Individual Plaintiffs offer no evidence regarding the magnitude of the diminished air quality nor the specific direct effect, if
any, that this diminished air quality will have on their health, environmental, and recreational interests. From the fact that the
air quality in the geographical area surrounding the landfill
would have been better had Defendant obtained a Part D permit,
Individual Plaintiffs summarily conclude that their health, environmental and recreational interests suffer injury, without filling
in the blanks.

***

The Individual Plaintiffs in the case at bar have made no such
showing [of how the pollutant discharges impair air quality].
They have not offered evidence establishing how much ozone
will be produced by emissions of VOCs from the landfill. . . . In
addition, they never established that increased ozone levels
would be severe enough to affect their health, recreational, or
environmental interests. . . . Instead, the Individual Plaintiffs cursorily rely on general EPA recognition that landfill emissions
present human health hazards.

***

In short, the individual Plaintiffs are too hasty in drawing a causal
connection between VOC emissions from the Morgantown Landfill and the potential injury to their health, environmental and
recreational interests. The individual Plaintiffs therefore have
not satisfied their burden of proving injury in fact and thus do
not have standing to bring this action. If they did have standing
on the facts before us, standing would become automatic for anyone living in the Northeast Ozone Transport Region.lG1

The Ogden decision has plainly adopted a causation-in-fact a p
proach to standing that would effectively rule out nearly all citizen
enforcement suits under the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air
Act. Despite uncontradicted evidence that plaintiffs resided in a
region declared to be in violation of health-based standards for
ozone, and that the defendant was illegally contributing ozonecausing pollutants to the same air quality area as plaintiffs' resi161. Id. at 869-70 (footnote omitted).
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dence, the court rejected standing because the plaintiff could not
identify any actual health impacts that they had suffered; or that the
unhealthy levels of ozone in the air could be attributed to defendant's own ozone emissions (rather than some other source). This is
precisely the impossible burden of proof that strict liability statutes
such as the Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act sought to avoid.
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania asserted that this result was
required by Defenders of Wildlife. Other post-Defenders of Wildlife
courts have not, however, been compelled to contract standing doctrine so narrowly. The courts reaffirming the parameter- and resource-based approaches to enforcement standing have not,
however, been able to articulate how these less restrictive standing
approaches fit into the doctrinal approach expressed in Defendersof
Wildlife. Indeed, most of these courts have failed to discuss Defenders
of Wildlife at all. In fact, as the next section of this article explains,
Defenders of Wildlife does provide support for the less restrictive resource-based approach to standing in Clean Water Act citizen suit
cases.
VIII. INJURY-IN-FACT
RIGHTLYUNDERSTOOD:
DPENDERTOF
w ~ ~ mSUPPORT
' s
FOR PROCEDURAL
INJURIES,
AND OTHER
INFORMATIONAL
INJURIES,
INTANGIBLE
INJURIES-IN-FACT
As can be seen from the review of Clean Water Act standing decisions since Defendersof Wildlife, the Def&s
of Wildlife decision has
failed to settle the law of citizens enforcement standing. Those
courts that take Def&s
of Wildlife's description of the tests for
standing at their most literal and look for specific, perceptible
harms to the plaintiff demonstrably related to the defendant's pollution pose impossibly high standards to establish standing, far beyond what is required to establish liability under the Clean Water
Act. Other courts have sought to implement the strict liability
scheme of the Clean Water Act and its clear intention that that
scheme be enforceable by citizen plaintiffs, but have not satisfactorily explained how an approach that presumes injury (the resourcebased approach) or presumes causation (the parameterbased a p
proach) squares with D e f i of Wildlife's apparently strict interpretation of injury-in-fact and its suggestion (at least in Justice Scalia's
majority opinion) that Congress cannot create a presumed injuryin-fact where constitutional injury-in-fact is lacking.
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Stepping back, it is easy enough to distinguish D e f e n h of Wildlife
factually from the typical citizens enforcement suit: Defenden of Wildlife, after all, rejected standing on the part of individuals who could
not definitively state when, if ever, they would return to the vicinity
of the environmental resource they sought to protect. The typical
citizen suit plaintiff, on the other hand, has no dimculty establishing her regular past and anticipated future use of local environmental resources for fishing, hiking, swimming, drinking, or
aesthetic enjoyment. What is more difficult is to reconcile the recognition of the inchoate harms that may form the basis of a Clean
Water Act citizen suit with the analytical and semantic framework of
D e f e n h of Wildlife, which focuses on "tangible" and "perceptible"
injuries, but also recognizes standing based on intangible "procedural" injuries.
The answer lies with a proper understanding of the sorts of injuries that may be considered "tangible" within the rubric of the
Supreme Court's standing decisions, as well as with an understanding of the overall scheme of the Clean Water Act, which may be
understood to create environmentally protective intangible rights
that are every bit as important and worthy of Article I11 recognition
as the "procedural" rights created by NEPA.
When these frameworks are properly understood, Supreme
Court standing doctrine clearly supports at least a resource-based
approach to standing. The "parameter" approach of Powell DufJiyn
fails to recognize the very'real stake of a person who satisfies the
M d o n test for interest in a protected resource, but who cannot
demonstrate a preexisting or imminent "perceptible" injury to that
resource. Defmhs of Wildlife provides explicit support for the
standing of such an individual plaintiff by recognizing standing of
such interested parties to enforce intangibles such as "procedural"
rights. Other Supreme Court standing decisions provide at least
implicit support for resource-based standing. And, once the plaintiffs interest in enforcing the overall Clean Water Act scheme is
recognized, the citizen plaintiff should satisfy requirements of "causation" and "redressability" as well.
A. Injuvin-Fact: Intangible Interests Tied to Tangible Resources
Despite the Court's repeated use of the terms "tangible" and
"perceptible" to describe the requisite "injury-in-fact" for standing
purposes, the Supreme Court has in fact been quite receptive to
standing claims based on intangible and imperceptible injuries
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throughout the history of environmental standing doctrine, right
up to and including the Defenders of WiIdZiJedecision. Thus, the Mmton Court recognized "aesthetic and environmental well-being" as
interests whose injury would support standing, despite the inherently intangible nature of these interests.16* Likewise, in Duke
Power, the Court recognized that "emission of non-natural radiation
into [plaintiffs'] environment would also seem a direct and present
injury," based on "our generalized concern about exposure to radiation and apprehension flowing from the uncertainty about the
health and genetic consequences of even small emissions."l6~The
Duke Power Court did not require proof that nuclear plant emissions
were likely to cause perceptible health impacts on the plaintiffs, or
even scientific consensus about its likelihood - a "generalized concern" and "apprehension" were s~t37cient.l~~
Likewise, the Court
has explicitly acknowledged Congressionally created informational
rights, injury to which .constitutes sufficient injury-in-fact, even without more.165
Most importantly, Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Defendem of
WiZdZije itself recognized that Congress could create intangible
rights, injury to which would support standing, by recognizing that
"procedural" rights are ~pecial.l6~
The key, to Scalia, is that these
162. Murim, 405 U.S. at 734.
163. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 74.
164. Keep in mind that the Duke Paoer holding was based on a factual record developed
after several days of hearings on the standing issue, so its analysis cannot be explained as a
result of the relaxed burden of proof necessruy at the pleadings or summaryjudgment stage.
165. In Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) the Court upheld the standing of minority "testers" to bring enforcement litigation under the Fair Housing Act. Testers
are members of protected minority groups who pose as potential home buyers or renters in
order to test real estate agents' compliance with non-discrimination laws. Even though these
testers were not actually seeking housing (and thus could'not claim injury by reason of having been denied housing opportunities), the Supreme Court upheld their claim to standing
based on a deprivation of a Congressionally created interest in accurate housing information.
Deprivation of this accurate information was sufficient to create injury-in-fact,without more.
166. Justice Scalia also suggested, implicitly, that suits other than those against the government are special. Justice Scalia's emphatic rejection of the possibility of Congressionally created suits in the absence of injury-in-fact had an important qualifier: "in suits against the
government, at least." The vast majority of the Supreme Court's standing cases, including
Defendm of Wildlijie, have in fact addressed suits by citizens against various officials and agencies of the executive branch of the federal govem'ment. It is in these cases that the separation of powers concerns articulated by Justice Scalia in Defmdm of Wildlife are implicated
most strongly. Relatively few of the Supreme Court's standing cases have considered citizens'
standing in enforcement suits against private, nongovernmental actors; indeed, none of the
Supreme Court's standing decisions has addressed citizens enforcement standing directly.
Clearly the separation of powers concerns articulated by Justice Scalia in Def&
of Wildlife
are not implicated in a suit, like the typical citizens enforcement suit, against a non-govern-
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"procedural" rights must be linked to some tangible resource that
the procedural right is meant to protect, and the plaintiff, in turn,
must demonstrate some sort of protectible interest in that resource
sufficient to give him a stake in a controversy about procedural
compliance. If the plaintiff demonstrates the sort of relationship
that the Marton court requires with respect to the resource that may
be impacted by the procedure in question, then that plaintiff has
standing whether or not he has established that tangible, perceptible injury has followed (or is imminent) as a result of the failure to
follow the procedure in question. The plaintiffs in D e f i s of Wildlife failed not because their interest in the Endangered Species Act
consultation requirement was intangible (which it was), but because their interest in the environmental subject that would be protected by that procedure was too remote and "intangible."
D e f i s of Wildlifeexplicitly recognized that the "procedural" system for the protection of environmental resources established by
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) was "special," at least to
the extent that NEPA plaintiffs should be excused from the usual
burdens of proving strict causation and redressability.16' NEPA requires that a federal agency considering a "major federal action sigmental actor. Enforcement of Congressionally enacted requirements against the private actor does not involve the courts in assuming a position of authority over a coequal
department, but rather puts the courts in their traditional role of applying statutory requirements to individual litigants.
The Supreme Court's development of standing docmne has occurred almost entirely in
the context of citizen or taxpayer suits seeking to force compliance by the Executive Branch
with constitutional or statutoxy requirements. From Fmthingtram v. Melfun, 262 U.S. 447
(1923), where the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of federal funding to improve
maternity care, through the challenge to the disposition of surplus property by the executive
branch in VaUq Fotge, through the challenge to the Price-Anderson Act in Duke Power and
right up to the challenge tothe ~ e ~ a r t m eof
n tInterior's endangered species consultation
procedure in Def&
of WIdlifi each of the Supreme Court's major pronouncements on
standing have been made in the context of a plaintiff asking the Court to step in and tell
another branch of the federal government what to do. Justice Scalia's offhand suggestion
that the injury-in-fact requirement is an irreducible minimum "at least in suits against the
governmentnacknowledges that these separation of powers concerns do not come into play
when a private citizen seeks to enforce a congression&lycreated right against another private
person. In such a case, the plaintiff does not ask the court to assert authority over a coequal
branch of government. Rather, the citizen-plaintiff seeks only judicial assenion of authority
over other persons withii the courts' jurisdiction - the traditionaljudicial role. This analysis suggests the possibility of Congressionallycreated enforcement suits without injury-in-fact.
Full analysis of this possibility is beyond the scope of this article.
167. D e f a d m of W f i p a t 572 & n.7. Although the opinion does not refer explicitly to the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Court's reference to the "procedural requirement for an environmental impact statement," id., must be read as a reference to the
environmental impact statement requirement of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).
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nificantly affecting the quality of the human environment" to
prepare an environmental impact statement disclosing and considering the environmental impacts of the action.le8 Justice Scalia's
majority opinion recognized that the NEPA plaintiff could never
prove that compliance with NEPA's requirements for preparation
of an environmental impact statement would necessarily, .or even
probably, lead to the rejection of the proposed federal action and
the preservation of the environmental resource in question. Because these rights would be otherwise unenforceable, Justice
Scalia's opinion seemed to recognize a kind of standing by
necessity.
The focus of standing inquiry in these circumstances shifts from
the identifiable harm that flows directly from the procedural violation (which is purely an abstraction, i.e., the right to have the
agency prepare a report disclosing the impacts), to the strength of
the plaintiffs tangible interest in the resource that the procedure is
designed to protect. Thus, a purely abstract injury (the deprivation
of a right to information and public comment) is sufficient "injuryin-fact" as long as the plaintiff demonstrates a sufficiently tangible
and ongoing interest in the resource that the procedure would promote, but not guarantee, protection of.
At some level, this distinction between procedural and substantive requirements must blur. Moreover, neither Def&
of Wildlife
nor any other case articulates any Article I11 or separationaf-powers
rationale for a constitutional distinction between those statutory
schemes deemed "procedural" and those deemed "substantive,"
much less any rationale that would justify' lRFS Article I11 enforceability for "substantive" statutory provisions. The question then is, why
should not the overall Clean Water Act scheme, which sets up permitting procedures as well as effluent limitations, be considered to
create rights in citizen plaintiffs worthy of protection so long as the
plaintiffs demonstrate the requisite interest in the resource that
would be protected by Clean Water Act procedures?
Certain sections of the Clean Water Act are explicitly procedural,
such as the requirement that Clean Water Act permits may be issued only after public notice and an opportunity for public comment.169 Other sections of the Clean Water Act explicitly create
informational rights, such as the requirement that all discharge
168. 42 U.S.C.5 4332(C).
169. CWA $5 402(a)(l), (b)(3),33 U.S.C.55 1342(a)(1), (b)(3).
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monitoring reports filed by a discharger be publicly available.l70
But the entire system of discharge bans, permit requirements, and
technology- and water quality-based effluent limitations established
by the Clean Water Act may also be viewed as systemic, or "procedural" provisions designed, like NEPA, to accomplish an overall enhancement and improvement in the tangible conditions of water
quality, without assuming that a tangible difference will be demonstrable in every case of compliance or non-comp1ian~e.l~~
So viewed, citizens enforcement of all aspects of the Clean Water
Act permitting program from "substantiven effluent limitations to
"procedural" public comment requirements to "informational"
rights to discharge monitoring reports satisfies Defenden of Wzldlqe's
"procedural" injury-in-fact requirements. It would make no sense
that the owner of waterfront property would suffer a cognizable
procedural "injury-in-factnif the chemical plant across the lake were
issued a Clean Water Act permit in violation of public notice and
comment requirements, but would lack the requisite "injury-in-fact"
to enforce the effluent limitations incorporated into that permit absent proof of specific, objectively perceivable damage to the body of
water demonstrably resulting from the violation. Certainly, the watexfkont property owner's stake in the enforcement of the effluent
limitation is every bit as weighty as a constitutional matter as his
interest in the procedural protections applicable before the permit
is issued. If the underlying interest in the resource affected is suBcient to support constitutional recognition of his stake in seeing
that the proper procedures are followed, this interest must also s u p
port his interest in seeing that effluent limitations and other permit
provisions designed to enhance water quality are also followed.172
170. CWA §308(b), 33 U.S.C.§ 1318(b).
171. Ironically, in writing about the procedud rights granted by NEPA, and finding that
deprivation of NEPA's procedud rights could constitute irreparable harm sufficient to s u p
port preliminary injunctive relief, then Judge (nowJustice) Breyer used the Clean Water Act
as an example of a statute that creates substantive, rather than procedural rights. Sierra Club
v. Marsh, 872 F.2d 497,500 (1st Cir. 1989). As discussed in this article, however, the distinction may not be quite so simple: the Clean Water Act includes explicitly procedural and
informational requirements, and its substantive prohibitions are themselves part of an overall
statutory scheme designed to enhance protection of the nation's waters much as NEPA set up
procedures designed to enhance the nation's environment generally.
172. Most citizens enforcement cases are brought by organizations on behalf of members
who establish the requisite interest in the protected resource as individuals under the standards articulated in Hunt v. Washington Apple Advert. Comm'n, 432 U.S.333 (1977). Efforts to establish organizational standing based on the organization's own interest and
expertise in particular environmental irncs have been uniformly unsuccessful. See Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.727 (1972); Lujan v. Defenders of Wddliie, 504 U.S.555 (1992);
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The Court's p r e - D e f i s of Wildlife standing doctrine also provides ample support for the enforceability of effluent limitations by
citizen plaintiffs without proof of perceptible declinesin water quality. As noted, the Duh Power Court recognized injury-in-fact based
on prospective exposure to non-natural radiation, without requiring proof that the levels of exposure possible were likely to have
perceptible health impacts.173 Similarly, exposure to "non-naturaln
pollutants in a water body should be sufficient injury-in-fact to
downstream users without proof that the levels of pollutants involved are likely to cause perceptible impacts. A demonstrable
change in the environmental resource is sufficient, provided that the
plaintiff establishes her interest in the resource affected.

Sierra Club v. SCM Corp., 747 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1984). However, it may yet be possible for an
organization to establish an organic organizational interest in a particular environmental
resource, and base its standing directly on that interest The W i t h Circuit has recognized
standing to enforce provisions-of the Endangered Species Act based on utility corpo&tions'
economic interest in maintaining the health of an ecosystem (and thus being free from further restrictions on hydroelectric power use of the resource). Pacific Northwest Generating
Coop. v. Brown, 38 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 1994). If a corporate economic interest is sufficient to
support standing, then it follows that an eleemosynar$ corporation with a charter that explicitly-pnts it an interest in preserving a particular environmental resource has a direct interest that is every bit as constitutionally valid as a for-profit corporation's economic interest in a
resource.
Many local and regional environmental organizations are in fact chartered for the specific
purpose of protecting a particular regional environmental resource, such as the various river,
bay, and sound "keeper" organizations. Seegenera& Robert F. Kennedy and Steven P. Solow,
Environmental Litigation as Clinical Education: A Case Study, 8 J. Envt'l Law & Lit. 319,324
(1993) (discussing Hudson Riverkeeper organization); Cmin v. B7owner, 898 F. Supp. 1052
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (plaintiffs include Delaware Riverkeeper, San Francisco,Baykeeper, Puget
Soundkeeper, Long Island Soundkeeper, and the Baykeeper for the New York and New
Jersey ~ & b o rES&).
These organi&ons ought to have-standig directly. Cf:.Friends of
the Earth v. Chevron, 919 F. Supp. 1042 (rejecting representational standing, but noting that
the plaintiff organization had failed to introduce any evidence of a direct interest in the
environmental resource); Cf: aka Sierra Club v. Morton, supra, 405 U.S. at 744 ( ~ o u ~ l a s , j .
dirsating) (noting that Sierra Club's charter makes the protection and consenation of the
Sierra Nevada Mountains one of the principal purposes of the organization).
173. Several courts have recognized that fear of health impacts due to exposure to environmental hazards is sufficient to support tort recovery, without proof that actual health
effects have resulted. See, e.g., Watkins v. Fibreboard Corp., 994 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1993);
Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1985); In re Moorenovich, 634 F. Supp.
634 (D. Me. 1986); see gmeralb, 4 G e m d , Environmental Law Practice Guide $33.02[3]
(1996). Such a fear of health impacts should likewise support standing for Article 111 purposes: certainly, an injury that would support ton recovevin state coun (and federal j&kdiction in a diversity case) must satisfy Article I11 injury-in-fact requirements. See aka Note,
And Justiciability for All?: Future Injury Plaintiffs and the Separation of Powers, 109 Ham. L.
Rev. 1066 (1996) (arguing that future injury tort plaintiffs must satisfy Article 111 standing
requirements, and concluding that in most cases, they can).
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In one of its very few dicta on citizens enforcement standing
under the Clean Water Act, the Supreme Court also seems to have
recognized that the effluent violation is itself the "injury-in-factnfor
standing purposes, and not the perceptible impacts on water quality
that may or may not result from a given effluent violation. This is
the only way to explain its suggestion in G w a l t y that allegations of
an ongoing effluent violation constituted the requisite Article I11
injury-in-fact,and Justice Scalia's explicit statement (in dissent) that
"[ilf . . . the defendant was in a state of compliance when this suit
was filed, the plaintiffs would have been suffering no remediable
injury-in-fact that could support suit."
Defendant's "state of non-compliancenis itself the "injury-in-fact"
that supports citizen standing. PoweU DufJiyn's rejection of the
claim that the violation itself constitutes the injury is thus unnecessarily restrictive even under Justice Scalia's approach to standing,
which, it is fair to say, represents the strictest view of constitutional
standing currently held by a Justice of the Supreme
The
"resource basedn approach to standing, which focuses on the plaintiff s tangible relationship to the resource that is put at risk of harm
by the defendant's violations, is more consonant with both the legislative intention of the Clean Water Act and current Supreme Court
standing doctrine.

B.

Causation and Redressability

Once the violation of Clean Water Act permit standards, procedural, or informational requirements is itself understood to give
rise to injury-in-fact in a plaintiff with a protectable interest in the
resource affected by the discharge of pollutants, the elements of
"causation" and "redressabilitynbecome less problematic. Just as
the NEPA plaintiff need not show that NEPA compliance would
174. Needless to say, it seems likely that an approach to citizens enforcement suit standing
which recognizes that violation of an effluent standard is per se an injury-in-fact to a plaintiff
with sufficient interest in the aEected water body would garner the support of a majority of
the current Court, given that Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Lujan explicitly recognized
that "Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will
give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before," Justice Stevens found standing
in Lujan based on the plaintiffs' intangible professional interests in the species that might be
afFected, and Justice O'Connerjoined Justice Blackmun's diient that would have found adequate procedural injury-in-fact to support standing. While it may be more difficult to predict
the views of Justices Gisburg and Breyer (who have replaced Justices Blackmun and White
on the Court),Justice Breyer's receptivity to the recognition of "irreparablenprocedural injury in Sioro Club v. Marsh suggests a willingness to recognize non-uaditional injury in s u p
port of environmental standing.
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guarantee protection of the resource of concern from despoilment
in order to establish standing, neither must the Clean Water Act
citizen plaintiff establish that compliance would restore the waters
of interest to their pristine condition, or even affect water quality in
any tangible way. It is sufficient, as with so-called "procedural"
rights under NEPA, that compliance with the Clean Water Act
scheme would, overall, have the tendency to restore, protect, and
improve the condition of the waters of interest, as contemplated by
the Clean Water Act.
The Clean Water Act violation is "redressable" in that an order of
the court requiring compliance extinguishes the procedural, or
schematic, injury suffered by the plaintiff. If the violation consists
of an exceedence of an effluent limitation, compliance ends the
plaintiffs "exposure to non-natural" substances in the water body,
to borrow a phrase from the Duk.e Power Court, at least to the extent
that the contribution of such substances violates the law. This understanding of the causation element in Clean Water Act citizen
suits is implicit in Justice Scalia's dissent in Gwaltney, suggesting that
cessation of the violation itself ends plaintiffs "injury-in-fact," redressing the injury that is the basis of suit. And, as acknowledged by
the Fourth Circuit in the Gwaltnty remand, assessment of penalties
by the court serves to redress plaintiffs injuries by having both a
special deterrent affect on future violations by the defendant before
the court, as well as the general deterrent effect on other polluters
of the same water body who may learn by e~a.rnp1e.l~~
This approach to citizens enforcement standing is simple to a p
ply and avoids embroiling the courts in the determination of contested issues of expert testimony just to determine jurisdiction to
175. Several commentators have criticized reliance on the deterrence impact of civil penalties to establish redressability. See Comment, Moomess and Citizen Suit Civil Penalty
Claims under the Clean Water Acc A Post Lujan Reassessment, 25 Envt'l L. 801 (1995);
Note, Ignoring the Trees for the Forest: How the Citizens Suit Provision of the Clean Water
Act V~olatesthe Constitution's Separation of Powers Principle, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1957 (1995).
These commentators rely on Linda RS. v. Richard D., 410 U.S.614 (1973), a case in which
the Supreme Court rejected the standing of a plaintiff to challenge the State's failure to
enforce child support laws, finding that the plaintiffs injury (lack of child support) would
not be redressed if her ex-husband were thrown in jail. Canied to its logical extreme, however, then no noneconomic inju~ywould ever be redressable, as the defendant might always
choose to incur contempt sanctions rather than comply with a court's injunctive order.
Moreover, the Linda RS. Court stated that its holding was limited to the unique circumstances of a constitutional challenge of a decision not to prosecute, id at 619, and in the
absence of a congressionally created grant of standing, id at 617 & n.3. Neither of these
factors is present in a Clean Water Act citizens enforcement suit
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hear a citizen suit claim. Instead, the court need only address the
sufficiency of the plaintiffs recreational, aesthetic, and environmental interest in the water body that is potentially affected, precisely as contemplated by the Supreme Court in its decisions
ranging from Morton through footnote seven of Def&
of Wildlif.
This approach is also clearly intended by Congress in its definition
of "citizen" as one "having an interest which is or may be adversely
affected," and by explicit reference in the legislative history to the
MdmL test.

IX. CONCLUSION
Contrary to many predictions, the environmental citizens enforcement suit remains alive and well even after the Supreme
Court's decision in Lujan v. Def&s
of Wildlife, Although the very
broadest assertions of standing, without individualized injury, remain problematic after D e f i of Wildlife, they are no more so
than before Defenders of Wildlife. The traditional basis of citizens'
enforcement standing - based on individual recreational and aesthetic enjoyment of the resource that might be affected - enjoys
additional support from Def&s
of WiIdlife's recognition that "procedural" standing need not be based on strict causation and redressability. Although the courts have yet to pick up on this distinction
and adopt an enforcement standing doctrine more consonant with
Congress' intended extension of standing to all those who satisfy
the Siara Club v. Mort012 test for interest in an environmental resource, neither has there been a general retrenchment in enforcement standing doctrine. Ultimately, the issue may yet need to be
resolved by a Supreme Court that, by its own dicta, remains open to
some level of Congressionally defined injuries and Congressionally
articulated chains of causation.
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